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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF PSEUDORANDOM SEQUENCES
Random numbers (in one sense or another) have applications in computer simulation,
Monte Carlo integration, cryptography, randomized computation, radar ranging, and
other areas. It is impractical to generate random numbers in real life, instead se-
quences of numbers (or of bits) that appear to be “random” yet repeatable are used
in real life applications. These sequences are called pseudorandom sequences. To de-
termine the suitability of pseudorandom sequences for applications, we need to study
their properties, in particular, their statistical properties. The simplest property is
the minimal period of the sequence. That is, the shortest number of steps until the
sequence repeats. One important type of pseudorandom sequences is the sequences
generated by feedback with carry shift registers (FCSRs). In this dissertation, we
study statistical properties of N -ary FCSR sequences with odd prime connection in-
teger q and least period (q − 1)/2. These are called half-`-sequences. More precisely,
our work includes:
• The number of occurrences of one symbol within one period of a half-`-sequence;
• The number of pairs of symbols with a fixed distance between them within one
period of a half-`-sequence;
• The number of triples of consecutive symbols within one period of a half-`-
sequence.
In particular we give a bound on the number of occurrences of one symbol within
one period of a binary half-`-sequence and also the autocorrelation value in binary
case. The results show that the distributions of half-`-sequences are fairly flat. How-
ever, these sequences in the binary case also have some undesirable features as high
autocorrelation values. We give bounds on the number of occurrences of two symbols
with a fixed distance between them in an `-sequence, whose period reaches the maxi-
mum and obtain conditions on the connection integer that guarantee the distribution
is highly uniform.
In another study of a cryptographically important statistical property, we study a
generalization of correlation immunity (CI). CI is a measure of resistance to Siegen-
thaler’s divide and conquer attack on nonlinear combiners. In this dissertation, we
present results on correlation immune functions with regard to the q-transform, a
generalization of the Walsh-Hadamard transform, to measure the proximity of two
functions. We give two definitions of q-correlation immune functions and the relation-
ship between them. Certain properties and constructions for q-correlation immune
functions are discussed. We examine the connection between correlation immune
functions and q-correlation immune functions.
KEYWORDS: FCSRs, half-`-sequences, autocorrelation, correlation immunity, q-
transform, q-correlation immune functions
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Nowadays, information technologies and communications fit into every corner of our
lives. People use the internet, banking systems, and mobile phones for social and
business interactions. Their data transactions and footprints can leave clues about
their most sensitive information and can cause harm in a variety of ways such as unau-
thorized illegal actions. The issues of guaranteeing secure transmission over public
channels has been widely studied in cryptology [58]. Cryptographic techniques are
used to provide confidentiality, authentication and data integrity during communi-
cation services such as email, banking or shopping on the internet. Historically,
cryptography was developed for the purpose of protecting secret information for mili-
tary and government organizations. Now it has become an indispensable tool used to
protect information in modern digital society. This dissertation concerns statistical
properties of certain high speed pseudorandom sequence generators. These have been
suggested for use as building blocks for stream ciphers.
1.1 Cryptography
Cryptography involves the processes of encryption of a plaintext (or message) and
decryption of the ciphertext (or encrypted message). Figure 1.1 shows the encryption
and decryption process, where ke is the encryption key and kd is the decryption key.
Ciphertext
c
Message m Message m
encryption with ke decryption with kd
Figure 1.1: Encryption and Decryption
There are mainly two types of cryptographic algorithms. One is asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms where ke 6= kd. These algorithms include the well known
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public key crypto-system RSA. The other type of cryptographic algorithm is sym-
metric cryptographic algorithms where ke = kd such as stream ciphers. The main
goal of cryptography is to design systems for securely transmitting information over
insecure channels. This goal is particularly challenging for transmission of large vol-
umes of information when the encryption and decryption must be fast. Since the
public key cryptographic algorithms are still far too slow for most practical needs,
many applications use public key cryptographic tools for key exchange and symmet-
ric key crypto-systems to provide confidentiality of data communication. The only
symmetric crypto-system that is guaranteed to be secure is the one-time pad. In
this system the message is first encoded as a binary sequence M = m0,m1,m2, · · · .
The sender and receiver of the message each has a copy of a random binary sequence
K = k0, k1, k2, · · · (the key). The message is encrypted by adding the key to the
message bitwise modulo two, forming the cipher
C = c0, c1, c2, · · · = (m0+k0 (mod 2)), (m1+k1 (mod 2)), (m2+k2 (mod 2)), · · · .
The message is recovered by the receiver by the same operation. This method is
provably secure against an adversary who knows part of the key. Moreover, it is
extremely fast, requiring a single exclusive or for each transmitted bit. However, it
requires the sender and receiver to securely share a key that is as large as the message,
hence is impractical for most situations.
Stream ciphers are practical solutions that use the same methods of encryption
and decryption as the one-time pad uses. They are typically used in digital telephones,
video on demand, and other applications where high volume data is transmitted. For
example, a stream cipher called A5/1 [11] is used to ensure the confidentiality of
phone conversations. Another stream cipher RC4 [54] is adopted by Wired Equiv-
alent Privacy (WEP), a part of the IEEE 802.11 wireless networking standard [20].
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Other examples include stream cipher E0 in Bluetooth [8], an industry standard for
short distance wireless networks. However, weakness and attacks on existing stream
ciphers are discovered, often using sophisticated mathematical concepts. For exam-
ple, the widely-used RC4 has serious flaws. As a result, several competitions were
undertaken by the cryptographic community to address the lack of secure stream
cipher standards that could be used by industry. These include the New European
Schemes for Signature, Integrity and Encryption (NESSIE) project [52] organized by
EU, the Cryptographic Research and Evaluation Committee (Cryptrec) [36] initiated
by Japan and the European Network of Excellence for Cryptology (ECRYPT) Stream
Cipher Project [55].
In a stream cipher the sequence K, however, is a pseudorandom sequence, which
is a sequence of numbers (or of bits) that appears to be “random” yet repeatable.
These sequences are often generated by a simple device called a keystream generator
whose initial state has a short description and is thus more easily shared than the
message. The goal of stream cipher design is to find keystream generators that have
short descriptions, are fast, and whose security approaches that of the one-time pad.
1.2 Statistical Properties of Pseudorandom Sequences
Pseudorandom sequences play an important role in many areas of communications
and computing such as the keystream sequences in stream ciphers, spread spectrum
communications, error correcting codes, and quasi-Monte Carlo integration. To de-
termine the suitability of pseudorandom sequences for application use, we need to
study their properties.
1.2.1 Period
One property is the minimal period length of the sequence. That is, the shortest
number of steps until the sequence begins to repeat.
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Definition 1.2.1 ([30, p. 15]) A sequence a = (a0, a1, · · · ) is eventually periodic if
there exists a p ∈ Z, p > 0 and u ≥ 0 such that
ai+p = ai for all i > u (1.1)
If u = 0, a is strictly periodic or just periodic. The smallest p that satisfies the eq.
(1.1) is called the period of a.
It is seen from the previous section that stream cipher encryption is based on
addition modulo two, so all of the strength of the encryption is derived from the
secrecy of the pseudorandom sequence. Since the pseudorandom sequence has a pe-
riod, an attacker knows that any terms separated by the minimum period length were
encrypted by addition modulo two with the same term and this is true for all terms
after the sequence begins to repeat. As a result, information may be leaked, security
may be lost. Therefore it is a basic requirement that a pseudorandom sequence that
is used for a stream cipher encryption should have large period and in particular
much longer than the message length.
1.2.2 Randomness
Pseudorandom sequences are required to satisfy several randomness properties; oth-
erwise attacks may be launched based on the statistical deviation between the pseu-
dorandom sequences and truly random sequences. In 1967 Golomb proposed three
postulates for the appearance of binary periodic pseudorandom sequences.
• It should be balanced. The difference between the number of 1s and the number
of 0s must be at most one.
• It should have the run property. About half of the runs (sequences of the same
bit) must be of length one, one quarter of length two, one eighth of length three,
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etc. Moreover, there must be equally many runs of 1s and of 0s for each of these
lengths.
• It should have an ideal autocorrelation function.
A binary sequence which satisfies Golomb’s randomness postulates is called a
pseudo-noise sequence or a pn-sequence [48, p.181]. The properties stated in the
above postulates can be empirically measured by various statistical tests. Pseudo-
random sequences are supposed to pass all the statistical tests of randomness that
can be found. Another important property is the unpredictability. Given the first k
bits of the sequence, it should be computationally infeasible to predict the next k+ 1
bit unless the secret seed is given. The best way to generate unpredictable random
numbers is by using some physical process such as thermal noise or radioactive de-
cay. However, these methods are extremely inefficient. In practice, pseudorandom
sequence generators based on deterministic algorithms are used to generate sequences
of bits. A random seed is used for these generators. An attacker must not be able
to make any correct predictions with probability significantly better than guessing
without the seed. This should hold even with the knowledge of design detail of the
generators. A pseudorandom sequence generator should have the following properties:
• good randomness properties of output sequences;
• speed and efficiency;
• reproducibility;
• large period.
1.3 Contribution
Feedback with carry shift registers (FCSRs), first introduced by Klapper and Goresky
in 1993 [42], are high speed pseudorandom sequence generators based on integer ad-
5
dition. They are important building blocks of pseudorandom sequence generators in
stream ciphers. Since speed and efficiency are important for pseudorandom sequence
generators, it is vital to have efficient hardware or software implementations for FC-
SRs. Lee and Park [43] proposed software implementations for word-based FCSRs in
2011. They improved the efficiency of software implementation of FCSRs by increas-
ing the size of register cells from 1 bit to k bits, where k is the size of words in a given
CPU (e.g. k = 32). Sequences of k bits are produced at every clocking. Their imple-
mentations with simple arithmetic operators (such as shifts, maskings, xors, modular
additions, etc.) over variables of size 232 or 216 are claimed to have better efficiency
than usual methods using conditional operators (such as ‘if’ statements) to handle
the carry in FCSRs. It is nice to see efficient software implementations for FCSRs,
but we also need the generated FCSR sequences to have good statistical properties.
In this dissertation, we call the FCSR sequences generated by the FCSRs with
the word-based software implementations as described by Lee and Park [43] half-`-
sequences [33] and investigate their statistical properties. These properties include:
• The number of occurrences of one symbol within one period of a half-`-sequence;
• The number of pairs of symbols with a fixed distance between them within one
period of a half-`-sequence;
• The number of triples of consecutive symbols within one period of a half-`-
sequence.
In particular we give a bound on the number of occurrences of one symbol within
one period of a binary half-`-sequence and also the autocorrelation value in binary
case. The results show that the distributions of half-`-sequences are fairly flat. How-
ever, these sequences in the binary case also have some undesirable features such as
high autocorrelation values. We give bounds on the number of occurrences of two
symbols with a fixed distance between them in an `-sequence, whose period reaches
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the maximum and obtain conditions on the connection integer that guarantee the
distribution is highly uniform.
In another study of a cryptographically important statistical property, we study a
generalization of correlation immunity (CI). CI is a measure of resistance to Siegen-
thaler’s divide and conquer attack on nonlinear combiners. In this dissertation, we
present results on correlation immune functions with regard to the q-transform, a
generalization of the Walsh-Hadamard transform, to measure the proximity of two
functions. We give two definitions of q-correlation immune functions and the relation-
ship between them. Certain properties and constructions for q-correlation immune
functions are discussed. We examine the connection between correlation immune
functions and q-correlation immune functions.
1.4 Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides basics
of linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) and FCSRs. The structure of keystream
generators is given. Useful mathematical tools and preliminaries on Boolean func-
tions are listed. Chapter 3 and 4 discuss some statistical properties of pseudorandom
sequences. More precisely, Chapter 3 investigates distribution properties of half-`-
sequences. We show that this type of sequences has a fairly flat distribution. In
Chapter 4, a combination of topics is addressed, including the distribution properties
of combined half-`-sequences, autocorrelation of half-`-sequences and distribution fea-
tures of `-sequences. Chapter 5 presents some results on correlation immune functions
with regard to q-transforms. We discuss certain properties and construction for this
type of function. In Chapter 6 we discuss future research directions on distribution
properties of pseudorandom sequences.
Copyright c© Ting Gu, 2016.
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Chapter 2 Background and Preliminaries
Shift register sequences are used in both cryptography and coding theory and many
other areas [28]. Because shift registers can be easily implemented in digital hardware,
many stream ciphers are made up of shift registers. Stream ciphers based on shift
registers have been used for military cryptography since the beginning of electronics
[58]. A feedback shift register consists of two parts: a shift register and a feedback
function. The shift register is a sequence of bits, whose length is the number of bits
it contains. Each time the new left-most bit is computed as a function of the bits
in the register. The right-most bit becomes the output bit and all of the remaining
bits in the shift register shift one bit to the right. The period of a shift register is the
length of the output sequence before it starts to repeat.
In this chapter, we recall LFSRs and FCSRs. Detailed information on LFSRs and
FCSRs can be found in the books by Golomb [28] and Goresky and Klapper [30]. We
show some statistical properties of two important types of pseudorandom sequences:
m-sequences and `-sequences, which are the maximum period sequences of LFSRs
and FCSRs respectively. We discuss different ways to represent Boolean functions
and the structure of keystream generators. At the end of the chapter we present some
useful mathematical tools that are used throughout this dissertation.
2.1 Linear Feedback Shift Registers
The simplest kind of feedback shift registers is the LFSR (see Figure 2.1). LFSRs
have been studied intensively for over fifty years [28]. They are widely used in areas
of cryptography and coding theory and other areas. They are simple and fast in
hardware implementations. Various statistical properties of the output sequences of
an LFSR can be fully analyzed by using efficient algebraic tools (principally using the
8
Galois theory of finite fields and the algebra of power series rings). Many fast devices
use LFSRs as building blocks to generate sequences whose statistical properties are
good. There are two modes of LFSRs: Fibonacci mode LFSR and Galois mode
LFSR. In general, it is preferred to use Fibonacci mode LFSR if the hardware for
implementation is effective at shifts and to use Galois mode LFSR if parallelisms
can be exploited. In this section, for simplicity, we only describe the Fibonacci
mode LFSR. Details on Galois mode LFSR can be found in Golomb’s book [28]. We
introduce an important type of pseudorandom sequence, the maximum period LFSR
sequences, and discuss their statistical properties in this section.
Definition 2.1.1 ([30, p. 23]) A (Fibonacci mode) linear feedback shift register of
length m over a commutative ring R, with coefficients
q1, q2, · · · , qm ∈ R
is a sequence generator whose state is an element
s = (a0, a1, · · · , am−1) ∈ Rm,
whose output is out(s) = a0, and whose state change operation τ is given by
(a0, a1, · · · , am−1)→ (a1, a2, · · · , am−1,
m∑
i=1
qiam−i).
Figure 2.1 shows the structure of a linear feedback shift register.
The output sequence a = a0, a1, · · · of an LFSR of length m satisfies a linearly
recurrence relation for all n ≥ m
an = q1an−1 + · · ·+ qman−m. (2.1)
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am−1 am−2 · · · a1 a0

ff
q1 
ff
q2 
ff
qm−1
ff
qm· · ·
⊕
- -
out
ff
ff
ff
ff
Figure 2.1: A Linear Feedback Shift Register of Length m.
The integer m is called the degree of the recurrence relation. The elements q1, · · · , qm
are called the coefficients of the recurrence relation. This recurrence relation can be
expressed by the polynomial
q(x) = −1 +
m∑
i=1
qix
i ∈ R[x].
This polynomial is called the connection polynomial or the feedback polynomial. It is
reciprocal to the characteristic polynomial of the above linearly recurrence relation.
The characteristic polynomial can be calculated by
f(x) = q(x−1)× xm = −xm + q1xm−1 + · · ·+ qm−1x+ qm.
If R is finite, then the number of possible states for an LFSR of a fixed length m
is |R|m, hence the state of the LFSR must repeat after |R|m steps. Therefore, the
output sequence is eventually periodic. Conversely, any eventually periodic sequence
a can be generated by an LFSR. The number of cells in the shortest LFSR that
can generate a is called the linear complexity or linear span of a. An LFSR with
a primitive feedback polynomial is called a maximum-length LFSR and its output
sequence is called an m-sequence. A formal definition of m-sequence is shown below.
10
Definition 2.1.2 ([30, p. 208]) The sequence a is an m-sequence (over finite ring
R) of rank r (or degree r or span r) if it can be generated by an LFSR of length r,
and if every nonzero block of length r occurs exactly once in each period of a.
In other words, the sequence a is the output sequence of an LFSR that cycles through
all possible nonzero states before it repeats and it has the maximum period |R|m −
1. An m-sequence is balanced, is equidistributed to the order of the size of the
corresponding LFSR, and has the run property. A sequence is equidistributed to
order r if for every k (1 ≤ k ≤ r) the number of occurrences of a block of length k
is in the inclusive range between bT/|A|kc and dT/|A|ke where T is the period of the
sequence and A is the finite set from which each symbol in the sequence comes. An
m-sequence is a pn-sequence from the definition in Section 1.2.2. More results related
to m-sequences can be found in Golomb’s book [28].
2.2 Feedback with Carry Shift Registers
An FCSR is another type of feedback shift register that is similar to an LFSR, but
with extra memory parts. More precisely, an FCSR is an arithmetic or with carry
analog of an LFSR. It was first introduced by Klapper and Goresky in 1993 [39].
The idea was motivated by the cryptanalysis of the summation combiner [56]. They
were also invented by Marsaglia [45, 46, 47] and Couture and L’E´cuyer [23, 46] in the
context of quasi-Monte Carlo simulation.
The analysis of FCSR sequences is based on N -adic numbers, which have been
studied since at least the early 1900s. An N -adic number a is an infinite expression
a =
∞∑
i=0
aiN
i
where ai ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}.
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Let
ZN =
{ ∞∑
i=0
aiN
i, ai ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}
}
.
By defining addition and multiplication operations of N -adic numbers, ZN forms a
ring and the additive inverse of the multiplicative identity element is
−1 = (N − 1)
∞∑
i=0
N i.
This ring ZN is an arithmetic or with carry analog of the ring of power series over
Z/(N). Let S = {0, 1, · · · , N−1}. Figure 2.2 shows an N -ary Fibonacci mode FCSR
of length m with multipliers (or taps) q1, · · · , qm whose state is a collection
(a0, · · · , am−1; z) where ai ∈ S and z ∈ Z.
z am−1 am−2 · · · a1 a0

ff
q1 
ff
q2 
ff
qm−1
ff
qm· · ·
∑
-
mod N
-
out
ff
div N
-
ff
ff
ff
ff
Figure 2.2: A Feedback with Carry Shift Register of Length m.
The state change of a Fibonacci mode FCSR is as follows. First we compute the
linear combination
σ =
m∑
i=1
qiam−i + z ∈ Z.
Then the contents of the state cells shift one step to the right and output the element
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in the right most cell. The left most cell and the next stage memory is updated by
am = σ mod N, (2.2)
z
′
= σ Div N =
σ − am
N
. (2.3)
In other words, the new state is
(a1, · · · , am−1, σ (mod N);σ (div N)).
An FCSR can also be described in its Galois mode [30, 32, p. 154]. A Galois mode
FCSR is preferred for parallelism consideration. One of the stream cipher candidates
in eStream project, the F-FCSR stream ciphers [2, 3], uses an FCSR in Galois mode.
Let N be a positive integer and S = {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}. Denote by the symbol∑
an integer adder (mod N) with carry. Figure 2.3 shows a Galois mode FCSR of
length m with multipliers (or taps) q1, · · · , qm whose state is a collection
(a0, a1, · · · , am−1; c1, c2, · · · , cm) where ai ∈ S and ci ∈ Z.
The state change of a Galois mode FCSR is as follows. First we compute the
linear combination
σm = cm + qma0
and
σj = cj + aj + qja0, 1 ≤ j < m.
Each of the new state cells and memory cells are updated individually by
a
′
j−1 = σj (mod N)
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Figure 2.3: Galois FCSR
c
′
j = σj div N = bσj/Nc
such that
Nc
′
j + a
′
j−1 = cj + aj + qja0 (1 ≤ j < m)
and
Nc
′
m + a
′
m−1 = cm + qma0.
The output sequence a = a0, a1, · · · satisfies a linearly recurrence relation with
carry modulo N for all n ≥ m
an +Nzn =
m∑
i=1
qian−i + zn−1. (2.4)
The integer m is called the length (or span or degree) of the recurrence relation. The
integers q1, · · · , qm are called the coefficients of the recurrence relation. The infinite
sequence zm−1, zm, zm+1, · · · of integers are the memory values. Set q0 = −1. We
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associate the recurrence relation with a connection integer
q = −1 +
m∑
i=1
qiN
i =
m∑
i=0
qiN
i. (2.5)
The following important theorem reveals the relationship between N -adic numbers
and the structure of an FCSR.
Theorem 2.2.1 [30, 40] Let q be the connection integer of an FCSR with initial
memory zm and initial loading a0, a1, · · · , am−1. Any output sequence a of this FCSR
is the coefficient sequence of the N-adic representation of the rational number
a =
∞∑
i=0
aiN
i =
f
q
∈ ZN , f ∈ Z.
An exponential representation is a useful tool to analyze shift register sequences.
Our analyses of distribution properties of half-`-sequence depend on the exponential
representation of FCSR sequences, an analog of the trace representation of LFSR
sequences. Let q > 1 and N be positive integers with gcd(N, q) = 1. Throughout
this dissertation, we shall consider only the case when q is an odd prime unless
otherwise specified. An N -ary FCSR sequence a = {ai}∞i=0 with connection integer q
can be algebraically defined or exponentially represented by
ai = N
−ih (mod q) (mod N), (2.6)
where h ∈ Z/(q), the residue ring modulo q. Here the notation (mod q) (mod N)
means first that the numberN−ih is reduced modulo q to give a number between 0 and
q−1 and then the number is reduced modulo N to give a number in {0, 1, · · · , N−1}.
We study the period of FCSR sequences here. The eventual period of an FCSR
sequence with connection integer q is a divisor of ordq(N), the multiplicative order of
N modulo q. The largest possible value of ordq(N) is φ(q), Euler’s totient function
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of q, and ordq(N)|φ(q). In the extreme case, φ(q) = q− 1 when q is a prime number.
In particular, when an FCSR sequence s achieves maximum period, in other words,
ordq(N) = φ(q), a is referred to as an `-sequence [29, 30].
Much work has been done on the statistical properties of `-sequences. Goresky
and Klapper showed that the number of occurrences of any two blocks in one period
of an `-sequence can differ at most by 1 if q is prime [41].
Theorem 2.2.2 Let a be an N-ary `-sequence based on a connection integer q = pt
with an odd prime p. Then the number n(b) of occurrences of any block b of size s
within a single period of a is
n1 ≤ n(b) ≤ n1 + 1 if t = 1
n1 − n2 − 1 ≤ n(b) ≤ n1 − n2 + 1 if t ≥ 2,
where
n1 =
⌊ q
N s
⌋
=
⌊
pt
N s
⌋
and n2 =
⌊
pt−1
N s
⌋
.
L-sequences are balanced and their arithmetic autocorrelations are zero [31, 42,
53]. The ordinary autocorrelation of binary `-sequences has also been studied. Xu
and Qi studied the expected value and variance of autocorrelations with prime power
connection integer [66]. They showed that when the connection integer is sufficiently
large, the autocorrelation for a random shift is low with high probability. Tian and Qi
gave an upper bound on the autocorrelations of `-sequences with prime connection in-
teger [61]. More specifically, the autocorrelation is less than or equal to 2 (dq/6e − 1),
where q is the prime connection integer. In this paper, we use the above result for
the estimation of the autocorrelations of binary half-`-sequences.
As in the case of linear complexity, the 2-adic complexity of a sequence is a measure
of the length of FCSR required to output the sequence.
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Definition 2.2.1 Let a = a0, a1, a2, · · · be an eventually periodic binary sequence,
whose 2-adic expression is
∞∑
i=0
ai2
i =
p
q
where gcd(p, q) = 1. Then the 2-adic complexity of a is the real number log2(φ(p, q)),
where φ(p, q) = max(|p|, |q|).
2.3 Boolean Functions
Boolean functions play crucial roles in the design of cryptographic primitives. In
particular, they are widely used as components of pseudorandom sequence generators
for stream ciphers. In this section, we recall different representations of Boolean
functions and their properties. A more detailed description on Boolean functions can
be found in Cusick and Stanica’s book [25]. We begin with some notations that will
be used throughout this dissertation.
Let Fn2 be the vector space of dimension n over the field F2 (Galois field with two
elements). The lexicographical order of vectors is defined as: for x, y ∈ Fn2 , x ≤ y if
and only if there exists i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n − 1} such that x0 = y0, · · · , xi−1 = yi−1 and
xi < yi. The Hamming weight of a vector x is denoted by wt(x) = |{i : xi 6= 0}|,
the number of nonzero positions. The support of a vector x is the set of indices of
nonzero positions, i.e., supp(x) = {i : xi 6= 0}. The Hamming distance between two
vectors x and y, denoted by d(x, y), is the number of positions in which x and y differ
from each other. For the purpose of clarity, we use “⊕” for addition modulo 2 and
“+” for addition in Z. The inner product or scalar product of two vectors x and y is
denoted as x · y = x1y1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xnyn.
A Boolean function f in n variables is a map from Fn2 to F2. The set of all Boolean
functions on Fn2 is denoted by Bn. A Boolean function f can be uniquely represented
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by its truth table as (f(v0), f(v1), ..., f(v2n−1)) where
v0 = (0, ..., 0, 0), v1 = (0, ..., 0, 1), ..., v2n−1 = (1, ..., 1, 1)
are ordered by the lexicographical order.
Another way to uniquely represent a Boolean function f is by the polynomial
f(x) =
⊕
a∈Fn2
cax
a1
1 · · ·xann ,
where ca ∈ F2 and a = (a1, · · · , an) with ai ∈ {0, 1}. This is called the algebraic
normal form (ANF) of f . The number of variables in the highest order monomial
with a nonzero coefficient is called the algebraic degree, or simply the degree of f .
The Boolean functions with degree less than or equal to 1 are called affine func-
tions. They take the form fa,c(x) = a · x ⊕ c = a1x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ anxn ⊕ c, where
a = (a1, · · · , an) ∈ Fn2 and c ∈ F2. If c = 0, then fa,0 (= fa) is a linear function.
A Boolean function can also be uniquely determined by its Walsh-Hadamard
transform. The Walsh-Hadamard transform plays an important role in cryptography.
For a Boolean function of n variables f(x) = f(x1, x2, · · · , xn), the Walsh-Hadamard
transform of f(x) at ω ∈ Fn2 is defined as
W (f)(ω) =
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)f(x)⊕ω·x
The Walsh-Hadamard transform is a useful tool to analyze the properties of
Boolean functions. For example, let 0¯ = (0, 0, · · · , 0) be the zero vector, a Boolean
function f is balanced if W (f)(0¯) = 0. It can also be used to measure the nonlinearity
of a Boolean function, the minimum distance from the set of all affine functions. The
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nonlinearity of f(x) is defined by
Nf = min
a∈Fn2 /{0¯},b∈F2
|{x ∈ Fn2 : f(x) 6= a · x⊕ b}|.
For cryptographic applications, we generally require that f(x) must be ‘far’ from
the affine map l(x) = a · x⊕ b, that is, Nf needs to be large. The Walsh-Hadamard
transform of f(x) can measure Nf by
Nf = 2
n−1 − 1
2
max
ω∈Fn2
|W (f)(ω)|.
Due to the Parseval identity on W (f)(ω), i.e.,
∑
ω∈Fn2 W (f)(ω)
2 = 22n, we have
Nf ≤ 2n−1 − 2n/2−1.
f(x) is called a bent function if the inequality above achieves equality. Indeed, f(x)
is bent if and only if |W (f)(ω)| = 2n/2 for all ω ∈ Fn2 .
Another notion of interest is the autocorrelation of a Boolean function. The
autocorrelation of a Boolean function f ∈ Fn2 is a real-valued function defined as
rf (ω) =
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)f(x)⊕f(ω⊕x)
for all ω ∈ Fn2 .
Boolean functions used in cryptographic applications are required to satisfy certain
properties to resist existing attacks. One such property is the correlation immunity of
a Boolean function, which comes from the relation between f(x) and linear functions.
We explain this notion in more detail in Chapter 5. One can find details on other
properties of Boolean functions in many books and papers [15, 16, 26, 57].
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2.4 Keystream Generators
In a stream cipher, a keystream generator (see Definition 2.4.1) produces a pseudo-
random sequence of bits. This sequence is added bit by bit with the plaintext to get
the ciphertext [30, p. 9]. Stream ciphers are used for transmitting large amounts
of data. They are extremely fast and are often implemented in hardware for added
speed. The keystream generator must be designed to produce a pseudorandom se-
quence with enormous period using a relatively simple algorithm. The keystream
sequence should be unpredictable from the knowledge of a (relatively small) segment
of the sequence; otherwise, it is vulnerable to a known-plaintext attack. In a known-
plaintext attack, the attacker attempts to recover a large section of keystream with
knowledge of a relatively small section of plaintext.
Definition 2.4.1 [30, p. 20] A keystream generator, or a discrete state machine
with output
F = (U,Σ, f, g)
consists of a discrete (i.e., finite or countable) set U of states, a discrete alphabet
Σ of output values, a state transition function f : U → U , and an output function
g : U → Σ.
Given an initial state s ∈ U , such a keystream generator outputs an infinite
sequence
F = g(s), g(f(s)), g(f 2(s)), · · ·
with elements in Σ. Fig. 2.4 shows a keystream generator with initial state s. The
state s is periodic of period T if starting from s, after T steps, the generator returns
to the state s. That is, if fT (s) = s. The least period of such a periodic state is the
least such T ≥ 1. A state s is eventually periodic if, starting from s, after a finite
number of steps, the generator arrives at a periodic state.
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- output function g -
Keystream g(s), g(f(s)), · · ·
Figure 2.4: Keystream Generator
LFSRs are pseudorandom generators by themselves, but they have some unpleas-
ant features. For an LFSR of length n, the internal state is the next n output bits
of the generator. By observing the first n bits of output, the attacker can obtain
the initial internal state. Since the state transition function of an LFSR is linear, all
the generated sequence of this LFSR can be retrieved by solving a linear system of
equations of the initial internal state. This property makes an LFSR by itself inap-
propriate for encryption. Also, the feedback coefficients of an LFSR with length n can
be determined from only 2n output bits of the generator by using Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm [7]. As a result, keystream generators based on LFSRs often employ non-
linear output functions. There are two widely used generator structures based on
LFSRs. One structure employs several LFSRs with a combiner function as shown in
Figure 2.5. The output bits of each LFSR serve as the input of a nonlinear Boolean
function f(x). The keystream sequences are the output bits of f(x). Another struc-
ture is an LFSR with a nonlinear filter function as shown in Figure 2.6. The internal
states of one LFSR serve as the input of a nonlinear function and this nonlinear fil-
ter function outputs the keystream sequences. There are various examples of stream
ciphers using LFSRs as building blocks. These include ABC [1], SOSEMANUK [6],
Sfinks [10], A5 [11], Yamb [24], Snow [27], Polar Bear [34], WG [50] and E0 [60],.
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Figure 2.6: A Nonlinear Filter Generator
Because the state transition or update function for an LFSR is linear, keystream
generators based on LFSRs still have weakness. For example, they are vulnerable to
algebraic attacks [13, 14, 21, 22, 37]. The basic principle of algebraic attacks is to
express the whole cipher as a large system of multivariate algebraic equations. This
system of equations can be solved to recover the secret key or the initial state of
the LFSRs. However, this fails for FCSRs. These devices were suggested to use for
generation of binary sequences with large periods. They share many good properties
with LFSR sequences. Their inherent non-linearity makes them promising building
blocks in stream cipher design. There have been several proposals of stream ciphers
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based on FCSRs [2, 4, 5]. One of them is the F-FCSR stream cipher in the eStream
project [55]. The F-FCSR stream cipher uses an FCSR in Galois mode and takes a
linear combination of the state bits to produce output. The stream cipher is extremely
fast due to the very simple output function. LFSR based stream ciphers are also
vulnerable to correlation attack. This attack works by exploiting known correlations
between inputs (or combinations of inputs) and outputs (or combinations of outputs).
Such attack depends on finding statistical biases in the outputs and reduces the
expected number of keys that must be tested in a search of the key space. We will
recall more about this attack in Chapter 5.
2.5 Mathematic Tools
The important mathematical tools used in this paper are exponential sums and the
discrete Fourier transform. Exponential sums are significant techniques in number
theory and are useful in various applications of finite fields. Group homomorphisms
called characters play a basic role in analyzing exponential sums in finite fields.
A character of an Abelian group G is a group homomorphism from G to the
multiplicative group C× = C \ 0 of the complex numbers. That is, it is a function
χ : G→ C such that χ(ab) = χ(a)χ(b). Let R be a ring. An additive character is a
character on the additive group of R. We can get a multiplicative character on the
multiplicative group of units of R. The Legendre symbol (see definition (2.5.1)) is an
example of a multiplicative character.
An integer a is called a quadratic residue modulo n if gcd(a, n) = 1 and
x2 ≡ a (mod n) (2.7)
has a solution (i.e., if a is a “perfect square modulo n”). If eq. (2.7) has no solution,
we say a is a quadratic nonresidue modulo n.
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Note here that if integer a does not satisfy the condition that gcd (a, n) = 1, it
can not be classified as a quadratic residue or a quadratic nonresidue. In particular,
0 is considered neither a quadratic residue nor a quadratic nonresidue. While the
modulus n can be any arbitrary positive integer, we are more interested in the case
when n is an odd prime.
Proposition 2.5.1 Let p be an odd prime. Then any a ∈ V = {1, 2, · · · , p − 1} is
either a quadratic residue or a quadratic nonresidue modulo p.
In other words, exactly half of |V | (i.e., (p − 1)/2) are quadratic residues modulo p
and exactly half are quadratic nonresidue modulo p.
In number theory, the Legendre symbol is an important quadratic character
χ(a) :=
(
a
p
)
where a ∈ F = Fp with p prime.
Definition 2.5.1 Let p be an odd prime. Let a be an integer. The Legendre symbol
of a modulo p is defined as
(
a
p
)
≡ a(p−1)/2 (mod p) and
(
a
p
)
=

1 if a is a quadratic residue modulo p,
−1 if a is a quadratic nonresidue modulo p,
0 if a ≡ 0 (mod p).
The properties of the Legendre symbol are useful in the analysis of distribution
properties of pseudorandom sequences in next chapter.
Lemma 2.5.1 Let p be an odd prime. Let gcd(a, p) = 1 and gcd(b, p) = 1 where
a, b ∈ Z. We have the following properties related to the Legendre symbol.
• if a ≡ b (mod p), then
(
a
p
)
=
(
b
p
)
;
•
(
ab
p
)
=
(
a
p
)(
b
p
)
;
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•
(
a2
p
)
= 1;
•
(
−1
p
)
=

1 if p ≡ 1 (mod 4),
−1 if p ≡ 3 (mod 4).
•
(
2
p
)
=

1 if p ≡ 1, 7 (mod 8),
−1 if p ≡ 3, 5 (mod 8).
We consider the sum of characters over all elements of a field. Notice that for
any a ∈ Fp with p prime, χ(a) is a complex root of unity since if ak = 1 we have
(χ(a))k = χ(ak) = χ(1) = 1. Let ξ be a complex primitive qth root of unity. In other
words, q is the smallest number such that ξq = 1. The exponential sums enter into
our problem by means of the following well known basic identity [62]
q−1∑
b=0
ξbc =
 q if c ≡ 0 (mod q),0 otherwise. (2.8)
Our analysis is based on Weil’s theorem, which is the one of the most beautiful
results in 20th century mathematics.
Lemma 2.5.2 (Weil’s Theorem [44, p. 223]) Let q be a prime greater than 2 and
ξ be a complex primitive qth root of unity. For a polynomial g(x) ∈ (Z/(q))[x] with
deg(g) ≥ 1, we have ∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c∈Zq
ξg(c)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ (deg(g)− 1)q1/2.
In particular,
∣∣∣∣∣∑
z∈Q
ξbz
∣∣∣∣∣ = 12
∣∣∣∣∣
q−1∑
c=1
ξbc
2
∣∣∣∣∣ = 12
∣∣∣∣∣
q−1∑
c=0
ξbc
2 − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12 (q1/2 + 1) ,
where b 6≡ 0 (mod q) and Q is the set of quadratic residues modulo q.
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The Fourier transform of a complex valued function f : Z/(q)→ C is given by
fˆ(b) =
1
q
q−1∑
c=0
f(c)ξ−bc.
By the Fourier inversion formula we have
f(c) =
q−1∑
b=0
fˆ(b)ξbc.
We also need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2.5.3 Let ξ be a complex primitive qth root of unity. For positive integers
c1, c2, N and z, we have∣∣∣∣∣
c2∑
j=c1
ξjNz
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣sin(piNz(c2 − c1 + 1)/q)sin(piNz/q)
∣∣∣∣ .
Proof . We have
∣∣∣∣∣
c2∑
j=c1
ξjNz
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
c2∑
j=c1
ξjNz
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ξNz(c2−c1+1) − 1ξNz − 1
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣sin(piNz(c2 − c1 + 1)/q)sin(piNz/q)
∣∣∣∣ .

Lemma 2.5.4 [18] For positive integers q and b with q > 1, we have
q−1∑
b=1
| sin(pibn/q)|
| sin(pib/q)| <
4
pi2
q log q + 0.38q + 0.608 + 0.116
d2
q
where d = gcd(b, q).
Copyright c© Ting Gu, 2016.
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Chapter 3 Distribution Properties of Half-`-sequence
3.1 Introduction
FCSRs are important building blocks of pseudorandom sequence generators in stream
ciphers. Since speed and efficiency are significant for pseudorandom sequence gener-
ators, it is vital to have efficient hardware or software implementations for FCSRs.
Lee and Park [43] proposed software implementations for word-based FCSRs in 2011.
They improved the efficiency of software implementation of FCSRs by extending the
size of register cells from 1 bit to k bits where k is the size of words in a given CPU
(e.g. k = 32). Sequences of k bits are produced at every clocking. Their two im-
plementations using full-size words (32 bits) and half-size words (16 bits) require the
connection integer of corresponding FCSRs to be congruent to −1 modulo N where
N = 232 or 216. Let q be the connection integer. When q ≡ −1 (mod N) with
N = 2k and k ≥ 3, 2 is a quadratic residue (QR) modulo q by the law of quadratic
reciprocity [49]. Hence also N = 2k is a QR modulo q. So every power of N is
a QR modulo q. Then the multiplicative order of N modulo q is at most φ(q)/2.
Since N is a quadratic residue modulo q, it follows from eq. (2.6), the exponential
representation of an FCSR sequence, that for every h, either all N−ih (mod q) are
quadratic residues or all are non-quadratic residues. It follows that the period of the
corresponding sequence is at most (q − 1)/2 when q is a prime. We give a definition
of these sequences and call them half-`-sequences [33]. The purpose of this chapter is
to estimate the distribution of the number of occurrences of one symbol, the number
of pairs of symbols with a fixed distance between them, and the number of triples of
consecutive symbols within one period of a half-`-sequence.
Let N = 2k with k ≥ 3 and q = q0 + mN for q0,m ∈ Z with 0 ≤ q0 < N and
gcd(q0, N) = 1. We consider an N -adic sequence s. I.e., s is generated by an FCSR
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Γ whose connection integer is q.
Definition 3.1.1 A sequence s with prime connection integer q is called a half-`-
sequence if the period of s is (q − 1)/2.
Let s = {si}∞i=0 be a half-`-sequence with period T and connection integer q. We
consider the distribution of sn, the distribution of (sn, sn+τ ), and the distribution of
(sn, sn+1, sn+2) for s with 0 < τ < T . For j = 0, 1, · · · , let
uj
q
=
∞∑
i=0
si+jN
i
be the N -adic expression of sequence s starting from sj. Then uj and uj+1 are related
by the equation uj = qsj +Nuj+1. Thus
uj+1 ≡ N−1uj (mod q) (3.1)
and
sj ≡ q−1uj (mod N). (3.2)
From eq. (3.1) it follows that either all uj are quadratic residues modulo q, or all are
non-quadratic residues modulo q. In the sequel, we always suppose they are quadratic
residues modulo q without loss of generality. On the other hand, from eq. (3.2) it
follows that for any v ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}, the number of occurrences of v in one
period of s equals the number of quadratic residues u with u ≡ qv (mod N).
For 0 ≤ τ < T let
G(τ)v = {x ∈ Z : 0 ≤ x < q,N τx(modq) ≡ v(modN)}, 0 ≤ v < N.
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Let mv be the largest integer j such that v + jN < q for 0 ≤ v < N . We have
G(0)v = {v + jN : 0 ≤ j ≤ mv}.
Let Zk = {x ∈ Z : dkq/N τe ≤ x ≤ b(k+ 1)q/N τc} for 0 < τ < T , 0 ≤ k < N τ − 1
and ZNτ−1 = {x ∈ Z : d(N τ − 1)q/N τe ≤ x < q}. We find that G(τ)v is the disjoint
union of N τ−1 many Zk with −kq ≡ v (mod N), i.e.,
G(τ)v =
Nτ−1−1⋃
j=0
Ztv+jN , (3.3)
where 0 ≤ tv < N satisfies tv ≡ −vq−1 (mod N). Also, |Ztv+jN | ≤ dq/N τe <
q/N τ + 1.
Define complex valued functions g
(τ)
v : Z/(q)→ C as
g(τ)v (x) =
 1, if x ∈ G
(τ)
v ,
0, otherwise.
The Fourier transform of g
(τ)
v (x) is given by
gˆ(τ)v (x) =
1
q
∑
c∈G(τ)v
ξ−xc.
3.2 Distribution of sn
We consider the distribution of elements in one period of a half-`-sequence s. For
0 ≤ v1 < N , let µ(v1) be the number of integers n with sn = v1 for 0 ≤ n < T .
From eq. (3.2), we know that µ(v1) equals the number of quadratic residues that are
congruent to
(qv1 (mod N)).
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Let Q be the set of quadratic residues. From eq.(3.3), we have
µ(v1) = |Q ∩G(0)v1 |.
Theorem 3.2.1 For an N-ary half-`-sequence s with prime connection integer q, the
number µ(v1) of occurrences of sn with sn = v1 for 0 ≤ n < T satisfies
∣∣∣∣µ(v1)− q − 12N
∣∣∣∣ < q − 12q + (q1/2 + 1)2 ·
(
4
pi2
log q + 0.38 +
0.608
q
+
0.116
q2
)
,
where 0 ≤ v1 < N .
Proof . Using Fourier transforms, we have
µ(v1) =
∑
x∈Q
g(0)v1 (x) =
∑
x∈Q
q−1∑
a=0
gˆ(0)v1 (a)ξ
ax
=
q−1∑
a=0
gˆ(0)v1 (a)
∑
x∈Q
ξax.
We first consider the case when a = 0.
gˆ(0)v1 (0) =
1
q
∑
c∈G(0)v1
ξ0 =
1
q
|{0 ≤ v1 + jN < q : 0 ≤ j ≤ mv1}| . (3.4)
We want to determine the number of j in eq. (3.4). We have
|{0 ≤ v1 + jN < q : 0 ≤ j ≤ mv1}| =
⌊
q − v1
N
⌋
+ 1.
Using the formula
n1
n2
− 1 <
⌊
n1
n2
⌋
≤ n1
n2
,
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we can get the lower and upper bounds
q − v1
N
<
⌊
q − v1
N
⌋
+ 1 ≤ q − v1
N
+ 1.
Hence we have
1
N
− v1
Nq
< gˆ(0)v1 (0) ≤
1
N
+
N − v1
Nq
.
Since when a = 0 we have ∑
x∈Q
ξax =
q − 1
2
then (
1
N
− v1
Nq
)
q − 1
2
< gˆ(0)v1 (0)
∑
x∈Q
ξax ≤
(
1
N
+
N − v1
Nq
)
q − 1
2
.
Then we consider the case when a 6= 0. We have
∣∣∣∣∣
q−1∑
a=1
gˆ(0)v1 (a)
∑
x∈Q
ξax
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
q−1∑
a=1
gˆ(0)v1 (a)
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x∈Q
ξax
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
q−1∑
a=1
1
q
∑
c∈G(0)v
ξ−ac
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x∈Q
ξax
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
q
∣∣∣∣∣
q−1∑
a=1
mv1∑
j=0
ξa(v1+jN)
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x∈Q
ξax
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Putting everything together, we get
µ(v1) =
q−1∑
a=0
gˆ(0)v1 (a)
∑
x∈Q
ξax
= gˆ(0)v1 (0)
∑
x∈Q
ξ0 +
q−1∑
a=1
gˆ(0)v1 (a)
∑
x∈Q
ξax.
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We have
∣∣∣∣µ(v1)− q − 12N
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣gˆ(0)v1 (0)∑
x∈Q
ξ0 +
q−1∑
a=1
gˆ(0)v1 (a)
∑
x∈Q
ξax − q − 1
2N
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣gˆ(0)v1 (0)∑
x∈Q
ξ0 − q − 1
2N
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
q−1∑
a=1
gˆ(0)v1 (a)
∑
x∈Q
ξax
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Then we apply the bounds on gˆ
(0)
v1 (0)
∑
x∈Q ξ
ax to get
gˆ(0)v1 (0)
∑
x∈Q
ξ0 − q − 1
2N
>
(
1
N
− v1
Nq
)
q − 1
2
− q − 1
2N
and
gˆ(0)v1 (0)
∑
x∈Q
ξ0 − q − 1
2N
≤
(
1
N
+
N − v1
Nq
)
q − 1
2
− q − 1
2N
.
That is,
gˆ(0)v1 (0)
∑
x∈Q
ξ0 − q − 1
2N
>
(
− v1
Nq
)
q − 1
2
and
gˆ(0)v1 (0)
∑
x∈Q
ξ0 − q − 1
2N
≤
(
N − v1
Nq
)
q − 1
2
.
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Then we have
∣∣∣∣∣gˆ(0)v1 (0)∑
x∈Q
ξ0 − q − 1
2N
∣∣∣∣∣ <
max
{∣∣∣∣(− v1Nq
)
q − 1
2
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣(N − v1Nq
)
q − 1
2
∣∣∣∣} ,
and hence
∣∣∣∣µ(v1)− q − 12N
∣∣∣∣
<
q − 1
2q
+
∣∣∣∣∣
q−1∑
a=1
gˆ(0)v1 (a)
∑
x∈Q
ξax
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ q − 1
2q
+
1
q
∣∣∣∣∣
q−1∑
a=1
mv1∑
j=0
ξa(v1+jN)
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x∈Q
ξax
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ q − 1
2q
+
(q1/2 + 1)
2q
·
(
4
pi2
q log q + 0.38q + 0.608 +
0.116
q
)
,
which completes the proof. The last inequality follows from Lemma 2.5.3 and Lemma
2.5.4. 
In [33], we first gave the following bound
∣∣∣∣µ(v1)− q − 12N
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12
(
1 + ln
(
q − 1
2
))(
q1/2 + 1
)
for the half-`-sequence in the one symbol case. Wang and Tan presented a new bound
in the one symbol case by using a more tighter bound on 1/ sinx [63]. This new bound
is ∣∣∣∣µ(v)− q − 12N
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ( 1pi ln
(
q − 1
2
)
+ 0.3
)(
q1/2 + 1
)
+
q − 1
2q
.
In this section, we give a tighter bound than that in [33, 63]. In Table 3.1, we
presents the comparison results of our bound with their bounds using the same series
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of connection integers as were used by Wang and Tan [63].
Table 3.1: Comparison of the bounds in one symbol case
Connection integer q bound in [33] bound in [63] our new bound
47 16 10 8
211 43 28 20
401 66 42 30
977 116 73 51
2003 180 114 79
4001 276 175 120
8191 426 270 184
20011 727 460 313
40009 1095 694 470
99991 1874 1188 800
131071 2194 1390 936
398287 4172 2645 1772
662551 5586 3542 2368
956261 6890 4369 2918
1299743 8206 5204 3472
3029711 13263 8412 5598
9999991 25978 16480 10933
2147483647 504997 320643 210591
3.3 Distribution of (sn, sn+τ )
We consider the distribution of (sn, sn+τ ) for s with 0 < τ < T . For 0 ≤ v1, v2 < N ,
let µ(τ ; v1, v2) be the number of integers n with sn = v1 and sn+τ = v2 for 0 ≤ n < T .
From eq. (3.2), we know that µ(τ ; v1, v2) equals the number of quadratic residues of
blocks of length τ + 1 that are congruent to
(qv1 (mod N),b, qv2 (mod N)),
where b is a block of elements of Z/(N). From eq. (3.3), we have
µ(τ ; v1, v2) = |Q ∩G(0)v2 ∩G(τ)v1 |.
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Theorem 3.3.1 For an N-ary half-`-sequence s with prime connection integer q and
0 ≤ τ < T , the number µ(τ ; v1, v2) of occurrences of (sn, sn+τ ) with sn = v1 and
sn+τ = v2 for 0 ≤ n < T satisfies
∣∣∣∣µ(τ ; v1, v2)− q − 12N2
∣∣∣∣ < (q − 1)(2N τ−2 +N τ−1)2q
+
(q1/2 + 1)N τ−1
2
(
4
pi2
log q + 0.38 +
0.608
q
+
0.116
q2
)
,
where 0 ≤ v1, v2 < N .
Proof . Using Fourier transforms, we have
µ(τ ; v1, v2) =
∑
x∈Q
g(0)v2 (x)g
(τ)
v1
(x) =
∑
x∈Q
q−1∑
a=0
gˆ(0)v2 (a)ξ
ax
q−1∑
b=0
gˆ(τ)v1 (b)ξ
bx
=
q−1∑
a=0
gˆ(0)v2 (a)
q−1∑
z=0
gˆ(τ)v1 (z − a)
∑
x∈Q
ξzx (we use z = a+ b)
=
q−1∑
a=0
1
q
∑
c∈G(0)v2
ξ−ac
q−1∑
z=0
1
q
∑
d∈G(τ)v1
ξ−d(z−a)
∑
x∈Q
ξzx
=
1
q2
q−1∑
z=0
∑
x∈Q
ξzx
q−1∑
a=0
mv2∑
j=0
ξa(v2+jN)
∑
d∈G(τ)v1
ξ−d(z−a)
=
1
q2
q−1∑
z=0
∑
x∈Q
ξzx
mv2∑
j=0
∑
d∈G(τ)v1
ξ−dz
q−1∑
a=0
ξa(d+v2+jN)
, 1
q2
q−1∑
z=0
∑
x∈Q
ξzxµz(τ ; v1, v2),
where
µz(τ ; v1, v2) =
mv2∑
j=0
∑
d∈G(τ)v1
ξ−dz
q−1∑
a=0
ξa(d+v2+jN).
We only need to consider the case
d+ v2 + jN ≡ 0 (mod q) for 0 ≤ j ≤ mv2 and d ∈ G(τ)v1 , (3.5)
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since otherwise
∑q−1
a=0 ξ
a(d+v2+jN) = 0 by (2.8). We want to determine the number of
pairs (j, d) satisfying eq. (3.5). For 0 ≤ i < N τ−1 we define
Di = {0 ≤ j ≤ mv2 : −(v2 + jN) (mod q) ∈ Ztv1+iN}.
All Di’s are disjoint with each other. We can show each j ∈ Di if and only if
d+ v2 + jN ≡ 0 (mod q) for some d ∈ Ztv1+iN ⊂ G
(τ)
v1 and
⌈
q − v2 − b(tv1 + 1 + iN)q/N τc
N
⌉
≤ j ≤
⌊
q − v2 − d(tv1 + iN)q/N τe
N
⌋
. (3.6)
In fact, D =
Nτ−1−1⋃
i=0
Di exactly contains all j satisfying eq. (3.5). We estimate the
number of j, i.e. |D|. Since
|Di| =
⌊
q − v2 − d(tv1 + iN)q/N τe
N
⌋
−
⌈
q − v2 − b(tv1 + 1 + iN)q/N τc
N
⌉
+ 1,
for 0 ≤ i < N τ−1, using the formulas
n1
n2
− 1 <
⌊
n1
n2
⌋
≤ n1
n2
and
n1
n2
≤
⌈
n1
n2
⌉
<
n1
n2
+ 1,
we can get the lower and upper bounds
|Di| > q − v2 − d(tv1 + iN)q/N
τe
N
− 1
−
(
q − v2 − b(tv1 + 1 + iN)q/N τc
N
+ 1
)
+ 1
=
b(tv1 + 1 + iN)q/N τc − d(tv1 + iN)q/N τe
N
− 1
>
1
N
(
(tv1 + 1 + iN)q
N τ
− 1− (tv1 + iN)q
N τ
− 1
)
− 1
=
q
N τ+1
− 2
N
− 1
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and
|Di| ≤ q − v2 − d(tv1 + iN)q/N
τe
N
− q − v2 − b(tv1 + 1 + iN)q/N
τc
N
+ 1
=
b(tv1 + 1 + iN)q/N τc − d(tv1 + iN)q/N τe
N
+ 1
≤ (tv1 + 1 + iN)q/N
τ − (tv1 + iN)q/N τ
N
+ 1
=
q
N τ+1
+ 1.
Hence |D| = ∑Nτ−1−1i=0 |Di| is bounded by the following inequalities
q
N2
− 2N τ−2 −N τ−1 < |D| ≤ q
N2
+N τ−1.
We first get a bound for µ0(τ ; v1, v2). We have µ0(τ ; v1, v2) = q|D|, so
q2
N2
− 2qN τ−2 − qN τ−1 < µ0(τ ; v1, v2) ≤ q
2
N2
+ qN τ−1.
Then we consider µz(τ ; v1, v2) for z 6= 0.
|µz(τ ; v1, v2)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
mv2∑
j=0
∑
d∈G(τ)v1
ξ−dz
q−1∑
a=0
ξa(d+v2+jN)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= q
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j∈D
ξ(v2+jN)z
∣∣∣∣∣ = q
∣∣∣∣∣
Nτ−1−1∑
i=0
∑
j∈Di
ξ(v2+jN)z
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ q
Nτ−1−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j∈Di
ξjNz
∣∣∣∣∣ (we use (3.6)).
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Putting everything together, we get
µ(τ ; v1, v2) =
1
q2
q−1∑
z=0
∑
x∈Q
ξzxµz(τ ; v1, v2)
=
q − 1
2q2
µ0(τ ; v1, v2) +
1
q2
q−1∑
z=1
∑
x∈Q
ξzxµz(τ ; v1, v2).
We have
∣∣∣∣µ(τ ; v1, v2)− q − 12N2
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣q − 12q2 µ0(τ ; v1, v2) + 1q2
q−1∑
z=1
∑
x∈Q
ξzxµz(τ ; v1, v2)− q − 1
2N2
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣q − 12q2 µ0(τ ; v1, v2)− q − 12N2
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ 1q2
q−1∑
z=1
∑
x∈Q
ξzxµz(τ ; v1, v2)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Then we apply the bounds on µ0(τ ; v1, v2) to get
q − 1
2q2
µ0(τ ; v1, v2)− q − 1
2N2
>
q − 1
2q2
(
q2
N2
− 2qN τ−2 − qN τ−1
)
− q − 1
2N2
and
q − 1
2q2
µ0(τ ; v1, v2)− q − 1
2N2
≤ q − 1
2q2
(
q2
N2
+ qN τ−1
)
− q − 1
2N2
.
That is,
q − 1
2q2
µ0(τ ; v1, v2)− q − 1
2N2
> −(q − 1)(2N
τ−2 +N τ−1)
2q
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and
q − 1
2q2
µ0(τ ; v1, v2)− q − 1
2N2
≤ (q − 1)N
τ−1
2q
.
Then we have
∣∣∣∣q − 12q2 µ0(τ ; v1, v2)− q − 12N2
∣∣∣∣ <
max
{∣∣∣∣−(q − 1)(2N τ−2 +N τ−1)2q
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣(q − 1)N τ−12q
∣∣∣∣} ,
and hence
∣∣∣∣µ(τ ; v1, v2)− q − 12N2
∣∣∣∣
<
(q − 1)(2N τ−2 +N τ−1)
2q
+
1
q2
∣∣∣∣∣
q−1∑
z=1
∑
x∈Q
ξzxµz(τ ; v1, v2)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ (q − 1)(2N
τ−2 +N τ−1)
2q
+
1
q2
q−1∑
z=1
|µz(τ ; v1, v2)| ·
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x∈Q
ξzx
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ (q − 1)(2N
τ−2 +N τ−1)
2q
+
q1/2 + 1
2q2
q−1∑
z=1
|µz(τ ; v1, v2)|
≤ (q − 1)(2N
τ−2 +N τ−1)
2q
+
(q1/2 + 1)N τ−1
2q
q−1∑
z=1
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j∈Di
ξjNz
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ (q − 1)(2N
τ−2 +N τ−1)
2q
+
(q1/2 + 1)N τ−1
2q
·
(
4
pi2
q log q + 0.38q + 0.608 +
0.116
q
)
,
which completes the proof. The last inequality follows from Lemma 2.5.3 and Lemma
2.5.4. 
Note here N τ should be sufficiently smaller than q. Otherwise, the bound in the
above theorem is trivial.
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3.4 Distribution of (sn, sn+1, sn+2)
The idea of previous sections can help us to investigate the number of occurrences
of three consecutive symbols in the half-`-sequence s. According to the definition
of G
(ω)
v , the number of occurrences of three consecutive symbols (sn, sn+1, sn+2) with
sn = v1, sn+1 = v2, and sn+2 = v3, denoted by µ(1, 2; v1, v2, v3), can be obtained by
µ(1, 2; v1, v2, v3) = |Q ∩G(0)v3 ∩G(1)v2 ∩G(2)v1 |.
Theorem 3.4.1 For an N-ary half-`-sequence s with prime connection integer q,
the number µ(1, 2; v1, v2, v3) of occurrences of (sn, sn+1, sn+2) with sn = v1, sn+1 = v2,
and sn+2 = v3 for 0 ≤ n < T satisfies
∣∣∣∣µ(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)− q − 12N3
∣∣∣∣ < (q − 1)2q
(
4
N
+ 3
)
+
(
q1/2 + 1
)( 4
pi2
log q + 0.38 +
0.608
q
+
0.116
q2
)
,
where 0 ≤ v1, v2, v3 < N .
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Proof . Using Fourier transforms, we have
µ(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)
=
∑
x∈Q
g(0)v3 (x)g
(1)
v2
(x)g(2)v1 (x)
=
∑
x∈Q
q−1∑
a=0
gˆ(0)v3 (a)ξ
ax
q−1∑
b=0
gˆ(τ)v2 (b)ξ
bx
q−1∑
c=0
gˆ(2)v1 (c)ξ
cx
=
q−1∑
a=0
gˆ(0)v3 (a)
q−1∑
b=0
gˆ(1)v2 (b)
q−1∑
z=0
gˆ(2)v1 (z − a− b)
∑
x∈Q
ξzx (we use z = a+ b+ c)
=
q−1∑
a=0
1
q
∑
d∈G(0)v3
ξ−ad
q−1∑
b=0
1
q
∑
e∈G(1)v2
ξ−be
q−1∑
z=0
1
q
∑
f∈G(2)v1
ξ−f(z−a−b)
∑
x∈Q
ξzx
=
1
q3
q−1∑
z=0
∑
x∈Q
ξzx
q−1∑
a=0
mv3∑
j=0
ξa(v3+jN)
q−1∑
b=0
∑
e∈G(1)v2
ξ−be
∑
f∈G(2)v1
ξ−f(z−a−b)
=
1
q3
q−1∑
z=0
∑
x∈Q
ξzx
mv3∑
j=0
∑
e∈G(1)v2
∑
f∈G(2)v1
ξ−fz
q−1∑
b=0
ξb(f−e)
q−1∑
a=0
ξa(v3+jN+f)
, 1
q3
q−1∑
z=0
∑
x∈Q
ξzxµz(1, 2; v1, v2, v3),
where
µz(1, 2; v1, v2, v3) =
mv3∑
j=0
∑
e∈G(1)v2
∑
f∈G(2)v1
ξ−fz
q−1∑
b=0
ξb(f−e)
q−1∑
a=0
ξa(v3+jN+f).
We only need to consider the case
v3 + jN + f ≡ 0 (mod q) and f − e ≡ 0 (mod q), (3.7)
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for 0 ≤ j ≤ mv3 , e ∈ G(1)v2 , and f ∈ G(2)v1 , since otherwise by eq. (2.8) we have
q−1∑
b=0
ξb(f−e)
q−1∑
a=0
ξa(v3+jN+f) = 0.
We want to determine the number of pairs (j, f) satisfying eq. (3.7). From eq.
(3.3) with ω = 1, since −q < −(v3 + jN) ≤ 0 such j must satisfy both
⌈
tv2q
N
⌉
≤ q − (v3 + jN) ≤
⌊
(tv2 + 1)q
N
⌋
and ⌈
(tv1 + iN)q
N2
⌉
≤ q − (v3 + jN) ≤
⌊
(tv1 + 1 + iN)q
N2
⌋
, 0 ≤ i < N.
We derive that j is an element of
T =
{
j :
⌈
q − v3 − b(tv2 + 1)q/Nc
N
⌉
≤ j ≤
⌊
q − v3 − dtv2q/Ne
N
⌋}
and
Ei =
{
j :
⌈
q − v3 − b(tv1 + 1 + iN)q/N2c
N
⌉
≤ j
≤
⌊
q − v3 − d(tv1 + iN)q/N2e
N
⌋}
,
for 0 ≤ i < N . We find that q/N2−2/N −1 < |T | ≤ q/N2 +1 and q/N3−2/N −1 <
|Ei| ≤ q/N3 + 1. On the other hand, we get that |T | is smaller than the right bound
of Ei minus the left bound of Ei+1, but larger than the right bound of Ei minus the
right bound of Ei+1. So we conclude
D = [1,mv3 ]
⋂
T
⋂
(
N−1⋃
i=0
Ei)
contains at most two disjoint intervals, say A and B, of integers. In fact, D = A∪B
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contains all j satisfying eq. (3.7). We get
q
N3
− 4
N
− 3 < |A|+ |B| ≤ q
N3
+ 2.
Hence we can get
q
N3
− 4
N
− 3 < |D| ≤ q
N3
+ 2.
We first get a bound for µ0(1, 2; v1, v2, v3). We have
µ0(1, 2; v1, v2, v3) = q
2|D|
and
q2
(
q
N3
− 4
N
− 3
)
< µ0(1, 2; v1, v2, v3) ≤ q2
( q
N3
+ 2
)
.
Then we consider µz(1, 2; v1, v2, v3) for z 6= 0.
|µz(τ ; v1, v2)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
mv3∑
j=0
∑
e∈G(1)v2
∑
f∈G(2)v1
ξ−fz
q−1∑
b=0
ξb(f−e)
q−1∑
a=0
ξa(v3+jN+f)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= q2
∣∣∣∣∣∑
j∈D
ξ(v3+jN)z
∣∣∣∣∣ = q2
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
j∈A∪B
ξjNz
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Putting everything together, we get
µ(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)
=
1
q3
q−1∑
z=0
∑
x∈Q
ξzxµz(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)
=
q − 1
2q3
µ0(1, 2; v1, v2, v3) +
1
q3
q−1∑
z=1
∑
x∈Q
ξzxµz(1, 2; v1, v2, v3).
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We have
∣∣∣∣µ(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)− q − 12N3
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣q − 12q3 µ0(1, 2; v1, v2, v3) + 1q3
q−1∑
z=1
∑
x∈Q
ξzxµz(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)− q − 1
2N3
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣q − 12q3 µ0(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)− q − 12N3
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ 1q3
q−1∑
z=1
∑
x∈Q
ξzxµz(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Then we apply the bounds on µ0(τ ; v1, v2) to get
q − 1
2q3
µ0(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)− q − 1
2N3
>
q − 1
2q3
q2
(
q
N3
− 4
N
− 3
)
− q − 1
2N3
and
q − 1
2q3
µ0(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)− q − 1
2N3
≤ q − 1
2q3
q2
( q
N3
+ 2
)
− q − 1
2N3
.
That is,
q − 1
2q3
µ0(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)− q − 1
2N3
> −(q − 1)
2q
(
4
N
+ 3
)
and
q − 1
2q3
µ0(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)− q − 1
2N3
≤ q − 1
q
.
Then we have
∣∣∣∣q − 12q3 µ0(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)− q − 12N3
∣∣∣∣ <
max
{∣∣∣∣−(q − 1)2q
(
4
N
+ 3
)∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣q − 1q
∣∣∣∣} ,
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and hence
∣∣∣∣µ(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)− q − 12N3
∣∣∣∣
<
(q − 1)
2q
(
4
N
+ 3
)
+
1
q3
∣∣∣∣∣
q−1∑
z=1
∑
x∈Q
ξzxµz(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ (q − 1)
2q
(
4
N
+ 3
)
+
1
q3
q−1∑
z=1
|µz(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)| ·
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x∈Q
ξzx
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ (q − 1)
2q
(
4
N
+ 3
)
+
q1/2 + 1
2q3
q−1∑
z=1
|µz(1, 2; v1, v2, v3)|
≤ (q − 1)
2q
(
4
N
+ 3
)
+
(q1/2 + 1)
2q
q−1∑
z=1
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
j∈A∪B
ξjNz
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ (q − 1)
2q
(
4
N
+ 3
)
+
(q1/2 + 1)
2q
· 2
(
4
pi2
q log q + 0.38q + 0.608 +
0.116
q
)
,
which completes the proof. The last inequality follows from Lemma 2.5.3 and Lemma
2.5.4. 
3.5 A Sharper Bound When N = 2
Theorem 3.5.1 Let a = a0, a1, a2, ... be a binary half-`-sequence with q ≡ 1 mod 8
and q an odd prime. Then a is balanced.
Proof . Since q ≡ 1 mod 8 and q is an odd prime, the order of 2 is (q − 1)/2. Then
we have 2(q−1)/2 ≡ 1 mod q. As a result, 2(q−1)/4 ≡ ±1 mod q. Because the order of
2 is (q − 1)/2, 2(q−1)/4 6≡ 1 mod q, we have 2(q−1)/4 ≡ −1 mod q.
There is an integer h so that for all j ≥ 0 we have
aj ≡ 2−jh mod q mod 2.
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Consider aj where j ∈ [0, (q − 1)/2). Then we have
aj ≡ 2−jh mod q mod 2.
and
a q−1
4
+j ≡ 2−(
q−1
4
+j)h mod q mod 2
≡
(
2−
q−1
4 2−j
)
h mod q mod 2
≡ −2−jh mod q mod 2
≡ (q − 2−jh) mod q mod 2,
which is the complementary bit to aj. So the first half of half-`-sequence a is the
bit-wise complement of its second half. Then the numbers of 1’s and 0’s in a are
equal. So a is balanced.

3.6 Experimental Results
In this section we analyze the imbalance properties of half-`-sequences by showing how
tight the bounds in Theorem 3.2.1, 3.3.1 and 3.4.1 are using experiment results. It is
impractical to investigate half-`-sequences with big qs and N = 232 or 216 as discussed
in Lee and Park’s paper by experiments. As a result, we choose half-`-sequences with
smaller Ns and qs for investigation.
3.6.1 Finding Satisfactory Connection Integers
To investigate the imbalance properties of half-`-sequences, we need to find satis-
factory connection integers for FCSRs to generate half-`-sequences. The condition
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on connection integers to generate an N -ary half-`-sequences is similar to that of an
N -ary `-sequences, both of which relate to the order of N modulo q. Let’s first look
at the the condition on the connection integer to generate an N -ary `-sequence. Let
q be a prime number. The condition on the connection integer q for the generation
of an N -ary `-sequence is that the order of N modulo q is q − 1. In other words, N
is primitive modulo q.
Lemma 3.6.1 Let p, q be prime numbers with q = 2p + 1. N is primitive modulo q
if and only if Np 6≡ 1 (mod q) and N2 6≡ 1 (mod q).
Indeed, since ordq(N)|ϕ(q) = q − 1 = 2p.
Similarly, we need ordq(N) = (q − 1)/2 for an N -ary half-`-sequence according
to the definition of N -ary half-`-sequence 3.1.1. That is, N (q−1)/2 ≡ 1 (mod q) or
the Legendre symbol
(
N
q
)
= 1. In the experiment, we generated some connection
integers q of the form
• q = 2p+ 1 with p and q prime; and
• q ≡ −1 (mod N).
The sequences generated by an FCSR with those connection integers are half-`-
sequences or `-sequences. Indeed, it is possible that either N (q−1)/2 ≡ 1 (mod q) or
N q−1 ≡ 1 (mod q). Note that when N ≥ 23, q ≡ −1 (mod 8). Then
(
2
q
)
= 1.
Therefore, (
N
q
)
=
(
2k
q
)
=
((
2
q
))k
= 1,
or N (q−1)/2 ≡ 1 (mod q). Since p = (q − 1)/2 is a prime, ordq(N) = (q − 1)/2.
Hence the sequences generated in this way are all half-`-sequences. These may not
be the only half-`-sequences, but they are just the easiest to find. We use the sieve
of Eratosthenes algorithm [9] to find all the primes numbers satisfying the conditions
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above. The sieve of Eratosthenes algorithm finds all prime numbers up to a given
limit. There are two ways to generate the half-`-sequence based on a specific q. One
uses eq. (2.2) with initial states and carry. The other one uses the algebraic expression
in eq. (2.6). In our experiments, we used the algebraic expression to generate the
half-`-sequences.
3.6.2 One Symbol Case
In this section we analyze the imbalance properties of half-`-sequences by showing
how tight the bounds are in the one symbol case.
Let
µ
′
(v) =
∣∣∣∣µ(v)− q − 12N
∣∣∣∣ , 0 ≤ v < N,
σv(q) =
q − 1
2q
+
(q1/2 + 1)
2
·
(
4
pi2
log q + 0.38 +
0.608
q
+
0.116
q2
)
and
δv(q) =
max{µ′(v) : 0 ≤ v < N}
σv(q)
.
The quantity µ
′
(v) is the difference between the number of occurrences of v in
one period of a half-`-sequence and the average number of occurrences. The smaller
δv(q) is, the more balanced the sequence is. Ideally, for a pseudo-random sequence,
we would like δv(q) to be close to zero. We generated the sequences for corresponding
q and calculated δv(q) for these qs. We would like to see how δv(q) changes as
the connection integers increase for a particular N . We have done experiments for
N = 8, 16 and 32. For each value of N , we generated δv(q) with FCSR sizes 2, 3 and
4. Note that if the size of an FCSR is m, then the corresponding connection integer
q ∈ (Nm, Nm+1). Fig. 3.1 shows that δv(q) for N = 8 with FCSR size 2, 3 and 4 is in
the range (0.05, 0.35). Fig. 3.2 shows that δv(q) for N = 16 with FCSR size 2, 3 and
4 is in the range (0.04, 0.3). Fig. 3.3 shows that δv(q) for N = 32 with FCSR size
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2, 3 and 4 is in the range (0.03, 0.25). We don’t see an increase or decrease pattern
as q increases from the three figures. We don’t know a way to find the best qs if
the period is large enough to be useful. µ
′
(v) is the product of δv(q) and σv(q). As
the connection integer q increases, σv(q) will increase accordingly. Thus µ
′
(v) will
increase accordingly.
Figure 3.1: Maximum ratio when N = 8 in one symbol case
3.6.3 Two Consecutive Symbol Case
In this section we analyze the imbalance properties of half-`-sequences by showing
how tight the bounds are in the two consecutive symbol case. This is a special case
when τ = 1 in Theorem 3.3.1.
Let
µ
′
(v1, v2) =
∣∣∣∣µ(v1, v2)− q − 12N2
∣∣∣∣ , 0 ≤ v1, v2 < N,
σv1,v2(q) =
(q − 1)
2q
(
2
N
+ 1
)
+
(q1/2 + 1)
2
(
4
pi2
log q + 0.38 +
0.608
q
+
0.116
q2
)
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Figure 3.2: Maximum ratio when N = 16 in one symbol case
and
δv1,v2(q) =
max{µ′(v1, v2) : 0 ≤ v1, v2 < N}
σv1,v2(q)
.
The quantity µ
′
(v1, v2) is the difference between the number of occurrences of
v1, v2 in one period of a half-`-sequence and the average number of occurrences. The
smaller δv1,v2(q) is, the more balanced the sequence is. Ideally, for a pseudorandom
sequence, we would like δv1,v2(q) to be close to zero. We generated the sequences
for corresponding q and calculated δv1,v2(q) for these qs. We would like to see how
δv1,v2(q) changes as the connection integers increase for a particular N . We have done
experiments for N = 8, 16 and 32. For each value of N , we generated δv1,v2(q) with
FCSR sizes 2, 3 and 4. Note that if the size of an FCSR is m, then the corresponding
connection integer q ∈ (Nm, Nm+1). Fig. 3.4 shows that δv1,v2(q) for N = 8 with
FCSR size 2, 3 and 4 is in the range (0.03, 0.17). Fig. 3.5 shows that δv1,v2(q) for
N = 16 with FCSR size 2, 3 and 4 is in the range (0.02, 0.12). Fig. 3.6 shows that
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Figure 3.3: Maximum ratio when N = 32 in one symbol case
δv1,v2(q) for N = 32 with FCSR size 2, 3 and 4 is in the range (0.01, 0.06). We don’t
see an increase or decrease pattern as q increases from the three figures. We don’t
know a way to find the best qs if the period is large enough to be useful. µ
′
(v1, v2) is
the product of δv1,v2(q) and σv1,v2(q). As the connection integer q increases, σv1,v2(q)
will increase accordingly. Thus µ
′
(v1, v2) will increase accordingly.
3.6.4 Three Consecutive Symbol Case
In this section we analyze the imbalance properties of half-`-sequences by showing
how tight the bounds are in the three consecutive symbol case.
Let
µ
′
(v1, v2, v3) =
∣∣∣∣µ(v1, v2, v3)− q − 12N3
∣∣∣∣ , 0 ≤ v1, v2, v3 < N,
σv1,v2,v3(q) =
(q − 1)
2q
(
4
N
+ 3
)
+
(
q1/2 + 1
)( 4
pi2
log q + 0.38 +
0.608
q
+
0.116
q2
)
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Figure 3.4: Maximum ratio when N = 8 in two consecutive symbol case
and
δv1,v2,v3(q) =
max{µ′(v1, v2, v3) : 0 ≤ v1, v2, v3 < N}
σv1,v2,v3(q)
.
The quantity µ
′
(v1, v2, v3) is the difference between the number of occurrences
of v in one period of a half-`-sequence and the average number of occurrences. The
smaller δv1,v2,v3(q) is, the more balanced the sequence is. Ideally, for a pseudo-random
sequence, we would like δv1,v2,v3(q) to be close to zero. We generated the sequences
for corresponding q and calculated δv1,v2,v3(q) for these qs. We would like to see
how δv1,v2,v3(q) changes as the connection integers increase for a particular N . We
have done experiments for N = 8, 16 and 32. For each value of N , we generated
δv1,v2,v3(q) with FCSR sizes 2, 3 and 4. Note that if the size of an FCSR is m, then
the corresponding connection integer q ∈ (Nm, Nm+1). Fig. 3.7 shows that δv1,v2,v3(q)
for N = 8 with FCSR size 2, 3 and 4 is in the range (0.008, 0.05). Fig. 3.8 shows
that δv1,v2,v3(q) for N = 16 with FCSR size 2, 3 and 4 is in the range (0.002, 0.17).
Fig. 3.9 shows that δv1,v2,v3(q) for N = 32 with FCSR size 2, 3 and 4 is in the range
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Figure 3.5: Maximum ratio when N = 16 in two consecutive symbol case
(0.0006, 0.0075). We don’t see an increase or decrease pattern as q increases from
the three figures. We don’t know a way to find the best qs if the period is large
enough to be useful. µ
′
(v1, v2, v3) is the product of δv1,v2,v3(q) and σv1,v2,v3(q). As the
connection integer q increases, σv1,v2,v3(q) will increase accordingly. Thus µ
′
(v1, v2, v3)
will increase accordingly.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we show some nice features of the distribution of sn, (sn, sn+τ ) and
(sn, sn+1, sn+2) in one period of a half-`-sequence. We discuss a special binary case
half-`-sequence which is balanced. Our methods for investigating the distribution
properties of half-`-sequences can be extended to investigation of distribution prop-
erties of sequences whose period is φ(q)/2k with k ≥ 2, e.g., quarter-`-sequence when
k = 2. We can get similar bounds but with larger constants due to the polynomial
degree increase in Weil’s theorem. The implementation efficiency for these sequences
53
Figure 3.6: Maximum ratio when N = 32 in two consecutive symbol case
might also decrease, since the size of the FCSR must increase to achieve the same
period.
Copyright c© Ting Gu, 2016.
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Figure 3.7: Maximum ration when N = 8 in three consecutive symbol case
Figure 3.8: Maximum ration when N = 16 in three consecutive symbol case
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Figure 3.9: Maximum ratio when N = 32 in three consecutive symbol case
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Chapter 4 Statistical Properties of Pseudorandom Sequences
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate various statistical properties of sequences related to
FCSRs. First, we introduce the distribution properties of N -ary sequences that com-
bine two half-`-sequences using addition modulo N . We give bounds on the number
of occurrences of two symbols with a fixed distance between them in an `-sequence
and obtain conditions on the connection integer that guarantee the distribution is
highly uniform. Furthermore, we discuss the autocorrelations of half-`-sequences.
4.2 Distribution Properties of Combined Half-`-sequences
Summation combiners [56] are stream ciphers that combine two or more binary m-
sequences using addition-with-carry operations. They have been studied during the
1980’s due to their speed and simple construction in hardware implementation. The
period of the resulting combined sequence reaches approximately the product of the
periods of the constituent sequences. The linear span of the resulting sequence was
known to approach its period. However, the 2-adic complexity of the resulting se-
quence is no more than the sum of the 2-adic complexities of the constituent se-
quences. In 2006, Goresky and Klapper considered the case of combining two binary
FCSR sequences using binary addition [29]. In particular, they considered combining
two distinct `-sequences using addition modulo two. Indeed, even though `-sequences
have good distribution properties, linear complexities and correlation properties, they
themselves should never be used as keystreams because of the existence of the 2-adic
rational approximation algorithm [30]. In this section we consider a similar problem
by combining two distinct half-`-sequences. We investigate the period and shifted
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properties of combined half-`-sequences. Distribution properties of combined half-
`-sequences are presented. At the end of this section we show some experimental
results about combined half-`-sequences.
4.2.1 Period and Shift Properties
Goresky and Klapper investigated the period of sequences that combine two binary
FCSR sequences using binary addition [29]. Let Z/(N) be the residue ring modulo
N . For all a, b, c ∈ Z/(N), if a+ b (mod N) = a+ c (mod N), then b (mod N) = c
(mod N). It is straightforward to derive the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2.1 Let a = {ai}∞i=0 be a periodic FCSR sequence of (minimal) period T1
with each ai ∈ Z/(N), and let b = {bi}∞i=0 be a periodic FCSR sequence of (minimal)
period T2 with each bi ∈ Z/(N). Let c = {ci}∞i=0 be a sequence with ci = ai + bi
(mod N) for each i. Suppose that for every prime p, the largest power of p that
divides T1 is not equal to the largest power of p that divides T2. Then c is periodic
and the period of c is lcm(T1, T2), the least common multiple of T1 and T2.
We consider combining two distinct N -ary half-`-sequences a = {ai}∞i=0 and
b = {bi}∞i=0 using addition modulo N to obtain a sequence c = {ci}∞i=0 where
ai, bi, ci ∈ Z/(N). Suppose a is a half-`-sequence that is generated by an FCSR
with connection integer q1 and that b is a half-`-sequence that is generated by an
FCSR with connection integer q2. Then the period T1 of sequence a is (q1 − 1)/2
and the period T2 of sequence b is (q2 − 1)/2. We can easily gain the period of the
sequence that combines two N -ary half-`-sequences using modular addition.
Theorem 4.2.1 Let a = {ai}∞i=0 and b = {bi}∞i=0 be N-ary half-`-sequences with
connection integers q1 and q2 respectively. Suppose that for every prime p, the largest
power of p that divides (q1 − 1)/2 is not equal to the largest power of p that divides
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(q2− 1)/2.Then the sequence c = {ci}∞i=0 obtained by ci = ai + bi (mod N) has period
(q1 − 1)(q2 − 1)
2 gcd(q1 − 1, q2 − 1) .
Proof . According to Lemma 4.2.1, the period of c is the least common multiple of
(q1 − 1)/2 and (q2 − 1)/2, which is
(q1 − 1)(q2 − 1)
4 gcd((q1 − 1)/2, (q2 − 1)/2) =
(q1 − 1)(q2 − 1)
2 gcd(q1 − 1, q2 − 1) .

Lemma 4.2.2 Let a = {ai}∞i=0 and b = {bi}∞i=0 be binary half-`-sequences with con-
nection integers q1 and q2 respectively. Suppose that one of the connection integers
is congruent to 1 (mod 8). Without loss of generality, let q1 ≡ 1 (mod 8). Let
c = {ci}∞i=0 be a sequence with ci = ai + bi (mod N). Suppose that q2−1gcd(q1−1,q2−1) is
odd and q1−1
gcd(q1−1,q2−1) is even. Then the second half of c is the complement of the first
half.
Proof . The second half of a period of the sequence a is the complement of the first
half and the same is true for the sequence b according to Theorem 3.5.1. Let T be
the period of c. Then
T
2
=
q1 − 1
4
q2 − 1
gcd(q1 − 1, q2 − 1) =
q2 − 1
4
q1 − 1
gcd(q1 − 1, q2 − 1) .
By symmetry therefore we have ai+T/2 = a¯ and bi+T/2 = bi whenever 0 ≤ i < T/2.
Here a¯ denotes the complement of ai ∈ Z/(2). Hence,
ci+T/2 = a¯i + bi (mod 2) = c¯i
which completes the proof.
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Lemma 4.2.3 Let a = {ai}∞i=0 and b = {bi}∞i=0 be binary half-`-sequences with
connection integers q1 ≡ 1 (mod 8) and q2 ≡ 1 (mod 16) respectively. Let b(τ) =
(bτ , bτ+1, · · · ) be the shift of the sequence b by τ . If gcd((q1 − 1)/2, (q2 − 1)/2) = 4
and τ = 4k for some k, then the sequence d = a + b(τ) (mod 2) is a shift of the
sequence c = a + b (mod 2).
Proof . Since τ = 4k for some k and gcd((q1 − 1)/2, (q2 − 1)/2) = 4, we have that
(q2−1)/4−τ is divisible by gcd((q1−1)/2, (q2−1)/2). As a result, there exist integers
m and n such that
q2 − 1
4
− τ = mq1 − 1
2
− nq2 − 1
2
.
That is
m
q1 − 1
2
=
q2 − 1
4
− τ + nq2 − 1
2
.
Therefore, for all j,
dj+m(q1−1)/2 = aj+m(q1−1)/2 + b
(τ)
j+(q2−1)/4−τ+n(q2−1)/2 (mod 2)
= aj+m(q1−1)/2 + bj+(q2−1)/4+n(q2−1)/2 (mod 2)
= aj + bj+(q2−1)/4 (mod 2)
= aj + b¯j (mod 2)
= c¯j.
By Lemma 4.2.2 the sequence c is a shift of its complement, so d is also a shift of
c.

Now we return to the general case of N -ary half-`-sequences.
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Lemma 4.2.4 Let a = {ai}∞i=0 and b = {bi}∞i=0 be N-ary half-`-sequences with con-
nection integers q1 and q2 respectively. Let b
(1) = (b1, b2, · · · ) be a shift of the sequence
b by 1. If gcd((q1 − 1)/2, (q2 − 1)/2) = 1, then the sequence d = a + b(1) (mod N)
is a shift of the sequence c = a + b (mod N).
Proof . Since gcd((q1 − 1)/2, (q2 − 1)/2) = 1, we have that (q2 − 1)/2− 1 is divisible
by gcd((q1 − 1)/2, (q2 − 1)/2). As a result, there exist integers m and n such that
q2 − 1
2
− 1 = mq1 − 1
2
− nq2 − 1
2
.
That is
m
q1 − 1
2
= (n+ 1)
q2 − 1
2
− 1.
Therefore, for all j,
dj+m(q1−1)/2 = aj+m(q1−1)/2 + b
(1)
j+(n+1)(q2−1)/2−1 (mod N)
= aj + bj (mod N)
= cj.

4.2.2 Distribution of Combined Half-`-sequences
Theorem 4.2.2 Let a = {ai}∞i=0 and b = {bi}∞i=0 be N-ary half-`-sequences with
connection integers q1 and q2 respectively. Let c = a + b (mod N) with period T .
For 1 ≤ k < T , let Ma(x¯) be the number of occurrences of k consecutive symbols
x¯ = (x1, x2, · · · , xk) in a and Mb(y¯) be the number of occurrences of k consecutive
symbols y¯ = (y1, y2, · · · , yk) in b where xi, yi ∈ Z/(N) with 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let Mc(v¯)
be the number of occurrences of v¯ = (v1, v2, · · · , vk) in c where vi ∈ Z/(N). If
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gcd((q1 − 1)/2, (q2 − 1)/2) = 1, then
Mc(v¯) =
∑
x¯∈(Z/(N))k
Ma(x¯) ·Mb(v¯ − x¯ (mod N)).
Proof . From Lemma 4.2.4, we know that a + b(1) (mod N) is a shift of c. By
induction, we can see that d = a + b(τ) (mod N) is a shift of c for 1 ≤ τ < T .
If we count the occurrences of the length k block v¯ in both c and d, then we will
have twice the number of occurrences of the length k block in c. We have c = a + b
(mod N) and each symbol in a is matched with each symbol in b. Thus, to count
the occurrences of v¯ in c, we want to count the number of pairs (an occurrence of
x¯ in a, an occurrence of v¯ − x¯ (mod N) in b). Thus we sum over all satisfactory
blocks x¯ and v¯ − x¯ (mod N) the number of occurrences of x¯ in a times the number
of occurrences of v¯ − x¯ (mod N) in b, that is,
Mc(v¯) =
∑
x¯∈(Z/(N))k
Ma(x¯) ·Mb(v¯ − x¯ (mod N)).

Corollary 4.2.1 Let a = {ai}∞i=0 and b = {bi}∞i=0 be binary half-`-sequences with
connection integers q1 and q2 respectively. Let c = a + b (mod N). If the connection
integer of one of the two half-`-sequences is congruent to 1 (mod 8), i.e. q1 ≡ 1
(mod 8) and gcd((q1 − 1)/2, (q2 − 1)/2) = 1, then c is balanced.
Proof . Let A1 and A0 be the number of occurrences 1s and 0s in a respectively. Then
A1 = A0, since q1 ≡ 1 (mod 8) according to Theorem 3.5.1. Let B1 and B0 be the
number of occurrences 1s and 0s in b respectively. If gcd((q1 − 1)/2, (q2 − 1)/2) = 1,
then
• the number of occurrences 1s in c = A1 ∗B0 + A0 ∗B1 = A1 ∗ (B0 +B1);
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• the number of occurrences 0s in c= A1 ∗B1 + A0 ∗B0 = A1 ∗ (B0 +B1);
which completes the proof. 
Theorem 4.2.3 Let a = {ai}∞i=0 and b = {bi}∞i=0 be N-ary half-`-sequences with
connection integers q1 ≡ ±1 (mod 8) and q2 ≡ ±1 (mod 8) respectively. Let µ(v)
be the number of occurrences of v in c = a + b (mod N) where 0 ≤ v < N . If
gcd((q1 − 1)/2, (q2 − 1)/2) = 1, then
∣∣∣∣µ(v)− (q1 − 1)(q2 − 1)4N
∣∣∣∣ ≤ N · σ(q1) · σ(q2),
where σ(q) is the maximum deviation of the number of occurrences of one symbol
from the average number of occurrences within one period of a half-`-sequence with
connection integer q.
Proof . Let ti = (qi − 1)/(2N), the average number of occurrences of a symbol in a
and b, and for 0 ≤ v < N let cv = Av−t1 and dv = Bv−t2. Then
∑
v cv =
∑
v dv = 0.
Therefore for 0 ≤ w < N ,
∑
u+v=w
AuBv =
∑
u+v=w
(t1 + cu)(t2 + dv)
= Nt1t2 + (
∑
0≤u<N
cu)t2 + (
∑
0≤v<N
dv)t1 +
∑
u+v=w
cudv
=
(q1 − 1)(q2 − 1)
4N
+
∑
u+v=w
cudv.
Thus
|µ(w)− (q1 − 1)(q2 − 1)
4N
| ≤
∑
u+v=w
|cudv| ≤ N · σ(q1) · σ(q2).
In particular, σ(qi) is bound by Theorem 3.2.1. 
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4.2.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we show experimental results on the combined half-`-sequences based
on different pairs of connection integers q1 and q2.
Let θ = gcd((q1 − 1)/2, (q2 − 1)/2) and
µ
′
(v) =
∣∣∣∣µ(v)− (q1 − 1)(q2 − 1)4Nθ
∣∣∣∣ , 0 ≤ v < N.
The quantity µ
′
(v) is the difference between the number of occurrences of v in one
period of a combined half-`-sequence and the average number of occurrences. Let
γ = max{µ′(v) : 0 ≤ v < N}.
Recall that our bound for σ(q) when q is the connection integer of a half-`-sequence
is
σ(q) =
q − 1
2q
+
(q1/2 + 1)
2
·
(
4
pi2
log q + 0.38 +
0.608
q
+
0.116
q2
)
.
From Theorem 4.2.3, we get the bound for a combined half-`-sequence based q1 and
q2 when θ = 1. We denote it as
ζ = Nσ(q1)σ(q2).
We investigate combined half-`-sequences when N = 2, 4 and 8. Table 4.1 shows
the distribution of combined half-`-sequences when N = 2. Notice that when one of
the connection integers of the two binary half-`-sequences is congruent to 1 (mod 8),
we have γ = 0, which means the combined sequence is balanced. For example, in
Table 4.1 when q1 = 41 ≡ 1 (mod 8) we have γ = 0. This result is consistent with
the result shown in Corollary 4.2.1. However, when N = 8, γ can never be 0 since
the connection integers must be congruent to −1 (mod N). From Table 4.1, 4.2 and
4.3, we can see that γ < ζ when θ = 1. This result is consistent with what we find
in Theorem 4.2.3. The fact that γ < ζ is not restricted when θ = 1. Actually when
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θ 6= 1, e.g., θ = 11 with q1 = 23 and q2 = 199 we have γ < ζ.
4.3 Distribution of (sn, sn+τ ) in an `-sequence
Using similar techniques as for half-`-sequences in Chapter 3, we have the following
theorem for the distribution of (sn, sn+τ ) in one period of an `-sequence s.
Theorem 4.3.1 For an N-ary `-sequence s with prime connection integer q and
0 ≤ τ < T , the number µ(τ ; v1, v2) of occurrences of (sn, sn+τ ) with sn = v1 and
sn+τ = v2 for 0 ≤ n < T satisfies
∣∣∣∣µ(τ ; v1, v2)− q − 1N2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ N τ−1(1 + ln(q − 12
))
.
where 0 ≤ v1, v2 < N .
However, we can get a sharper bound using another method according to Lemma
4.3.1 below.
Lemma 4.3.1 [30] Let s be an N-ary `-sequence based on connection integer q with
q an odd prime. Then the number Ms(b) of occurrences of any block b of size τ
within a single period of s is
⌊ q
N τ
⌋
≤Ms(b) ≤
⌊ q
N τ
⌋
+ 1.
Theorem 4.3.2 For an N-ary `-sequence s with prime connection integer q and
0 ≤ τ < T , the number µ(τ ; v1, v2) of integers n with sn = v1 and sn+τ = v2 for
0 ≤ n < T satisfies ∣∣∣∣µ(τ ; v1, v2)− q − 1N2
∣∣∣∣ < N τ−1 +N2.
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Table 4.1: Distribution of combined half-`-sequences when N = 2
q1 q2 θ γ ζ
23 41 1 0 80
23 47 1 8 87
23 71 1 11 111
23 79 1 8 119
23 97 1 0 135
23 103 1 8 140
23 137 1 0 166
23 167 1 17 188
23 191 1 20 204
23 193 1 0 205
23 199 11 6 209
23 239 1 23 233
23 263 1 20 248
23 271 1 17 252
23 311 1 29 274
23 313 1 0 275
23 359 1 29 299
23 367 1 14 303
23 383 1 26 312
23 401 1 0 320
23 409 1 0 324
41 47 1 0 122
41 71 5 0 157
41 79 1 0 167
41 97 4 0 190
41 103 1 0 197
41 137 4 0 234
41 167 1 0 264
41 191 5 0 287
41 193 4 0 289
41 199 1 0 294
41 239 1 0 329
41 263 1 0 349
41 271 5 0 355
41 311 5 0 387
41 313 4 30 388
41 359 1 0 422
41 367 1 0 428
41 383 1 0 439
41 401 20 0 451
41 409 4 30 457
47 71 1 18 170
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Table 4.2: Distribution of combined half-`-sequences when N = 4
q1 q2 θ γ ζ
23 47 1 7 174
23 71 1 10 223
23 79 1 7 238
23 103 1 7 280
23 167 1 16 376
23 191 1 19 408
23 199 11 8 418
23 239 1 22 467
23 263 1 19 496
23 271 1 16 505
23 311 1 28 549
23 359 1 28 599
23 367 1 13 607
23 383 1 25 624
47 71 1 17 341
47 79 1 12 364
47 103 1 12 428
47 167 1 27 574
47 191 1 32 623
47 199 1 22 639
47 239 1 37 715
47 263 1 32 758
47 271 1 27 772
47 311 1 47 840
47 359 1 47 916
47 367 1 22 929
47 383 1 42 953
71 79 1 17 467
71 103 1 17 549
71 167 1 38 737
71 191 5 31 800
71 199 1 31 820
71 239 7 22 917
71 263 1 45 972
71 271 5 7 990
71 311 5 18 1077
71 359 1 66 1175
71 367 1 31 1191
71 383 1 59 1223
79 103 3 7 585
79 167 1 27 786
79 191 1 32 853
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Table 4.3: Distribution of combined half-`-sequences when N = 8
q1 q2 θ γ ζ
167 263 1 53 3272
167 359 1 77 3956
167 383 1 70 4115
167 479 1 101 4716
167 503 1 86 4859
167 719 1 125 6038
167 839 1 134 6632
167 863 1 86 6746
167 887 1 118 6859
263 359 1 93 5219
263 383 1 81 5429
263 479 1 122 6222
263 503 1 102 6410
263 719 1 152 7967
263 839 1 162 8750
263 863 1 101 8901
263 887 1 142 9050
359 383 1 114 6564
359 479 1 185 7523
359 503 1 150 7751
359 719 1 233 9632
359 839 1 246 10579
359 863 1 146 10762
359 887 1 214 10942
383 479 1 151 7826
383 503 1 132 8063
383 719 1 184 10020
383 839 1 198 11005
383 863 1 136 11195
383 887 1 176 11383
479 503 1 197 9240
479 719 1 307 11483
479 839 1 323 12612
479 863 1 193 12830
479 887 1 281 13045
503 719 1 245 11831
503 839 1 261 12993
503 863 1 164 13217
503 887 1 229 13439
719 839 1 407 16148
719 863 1 238 16426
719 887 1 353 16702
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Proof . Let b denote any block of τ−1 consecutive symbols. Let Ms(v1,b, v2) be the
occurrences of v1,b, v2 within one period of s. According to Lemma 4.3.1, we have
∣∣∣∣Ms(v1,b, v2)− q − 1N τ+1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 + 1N τ+1 ,
and
µ(τ ; v1, v2) =
∑
b
Ms(v1,b, v2),
where the sum is over all possible choices of b and there are N τ−1 of them. Then we
have
∣∣∣∣µ(τ ; v1, v2)− q − 1N2
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣N τ−1Ms(v1,b, v2)− q − 1N2
∣∣∣∣
= N τ−1
∣∣∣∣Ms(v1,b, v2)− q − 1N τ+1
∣∣∣∣
≤
(
1 +
1
N τ+1
)
N τ−1 = N τ−1 +
1
N2
.
which completes the proof. 
Furthermore, we get a sharper bound when N τ+1 < q with constraints on q. To
do this, we investigate the bound for |µ(τ ; v1, v2) − µ(τ ;u1, u2)| instead where v1, v2
and u1, u2 are two pairs of values that vary from 0 to N − 1. Here µ(τ ; v1, v2) is the
number of integers n with sn = v1 and sn+τ = v2 in an `-sequence s and similarly
µ(τ ;u1, u2) is the number of integers n with sn = u1 and sn+τ = u2 in s.
Theorem 4.3.3 Let s be an N-ary `-sequence with prime connection integer q =∑r
i=0 qiN
i where 0 ≤ qi < N for some positive integer r and 0 ≤ τ < T . If q1 =
q2 = · · · = qτ = 0 or q1 = q2 = · · · = qτ = N − 1, then the numbers µ(τ ; v1, v2) and
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µ(τ ;u1, u2) of occurrences of (sn, sn+τ ) with sn = v1, sn+τ = v2 and sn = u1, sn+τ = u2
for 0 ≤ n < T satisfy
|µ(τ ; v1, v2)− µ(τ ;u1, u2)| ≤ 1,
where 0 ≤ v1, v2, u1, u2 < N .
Proof . Let b be a block of consecutive symbols with length τ + 1 and let
b =
τ∑
i=0
biN
i and q′ =
τ∑
i=0
qiN
i
where b0 = v1, bτ = v2. The proof of Lemma 4.3.1 in [30] shows that if b < q
′, then
n(b) = n1 + 1 and if b ≥ q′, then n(b) = n1 where n1 = bq/N τ+1c.
We first count the occurrences of (sn, sn+τ ) with sn = v1, sn+τ = v2. If bτ = v2 >
qτ , then b > q
′ and there are N τ−1 such bs. If bτ = v2 < qτ , then b < q′ and there are
N τ−1 such bs. If v2 = qτ , then let q′′ = q′ − qτN τ =
∑τ−1
i=0 qiN
i and b′′ = b − v2N τ .
We see that b < q′ if and only if b′′ < q′′.
Let ρ1 = |{b : 0 ≤ b′′ < q′′}|. Then
ρ1 =
τ−1∑
i=1
qiN
i−1 + ρ
′
1, (4.1)
where the value of ρ
′
1 depends on the relation between v1 and q0. Actually,
ρ
′
1 =
 1 if v1 < q0,0 otherwise. (4.2)
Let ρ2 = |{b : b′′ ≥ q′′}|. Since the total number of b′′s is N τ−1, we have
ρ2 = N
τ−1 − ρ1.
From the analysis above we can get all the possible value for µ(τ ; v1, v2), which
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are
(I) (n1 + 1)N
τ−1 if v2 < qτ ;
(II) n1N
τ−1 if v2 > qτ ;
(III)
∑τ−1
i=1 qiN
i−1 + 1 +N τ−1n1 if v2 = qτ and v1 < q0;
(IV)
∑τ−1
i=1 qiN
i−1 +N τ−1n1 if v2 = qτ and v1 ≥ q0.
The above four cases also apply to µ(τ ;u1, u2).
When q1 = q2 = · · · = qτ = 0, by eqs. (4.1) and (4.2) we have ρ1 = 1 or 0. Since
v1, v2, u1 and u2 vary from 0 to N − 1, µ(τ ; v1, v2) and µ(τ ;u1, u2) can only reach
the possible value in (II), (III) or (IV). Thus, µ(τ ; v1, v2) can be either n1N
τ−1 or
n1N
τ−1 + 1. Similarly µ(τ ;u1, u2) can be either n1N τ−1 or n1N τ−1 + 1. As a result,
|µ(τ ; v1, v2)− µ(τ ;u1, u2)| ≤ 1.
When q1 = q2 = · · · = qτ = N − 1, by eqs. (4.1) and (4.2) we have
ρ1 = N
τ−1 or N τ−1 − 1.
In this case, µ(τ ; v1, v2) and µ(τ ;u1, u2) can only reach the possible value in (I),
(III) or (IV). Thus
|µ(τ ; v1, v2)− µ(τ ;u1, u2)| ≤ 1.

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4.4 Autocorrelation of Binary Half-`-sequences
Correlation properties of pseudorandom sequences are important measures of random-
ness. They have practical applications in spread spectrum communication systems,
radar systems, cryptanalysis, and so on [30]. Recall that the autocorrelation function
of a binary periodic sequence s = {si}∞0 with period T is defined as
Cs(τ) =
T−1∑
i=0
(−1)si+si+τ
for 0 ≤ τ < T . The autocorrelation function measures the similarity of the sequence
and its shifted versions. We have Cs(0) = T . Much research has been done on criteria
for optimal autocorrelation sequences [12, 67]. A sequence s is said to have optimal
autocorrelation if for any τ 6= 0, we have
(1) Cs(τ) = −1 and T ≡ −1 (mod 4); or
(2) Cs(τ) ∈ {1,−3} and T ≡ 1 (mod 4); or
(3) Cs(τ) ∈ {2,−2} and T ≡ 2 (mod 4); or
(4) Cs(τ) ∈ {0,−4} and T ≡ 0 (mod 4).
Sequences satisfying criteria (1) include Legendre sequences, Hall’s sextic residue
sequences, twin-prime sequences, m-sequences, GMW sequences, and Maschiettie’s
hyperoval sequences. These sequences are also said to have ideal 2-level autocorrela-
tion. One can find more detailed definitions of these sequences in [12, 67].
In this section, we investigate the autocorrelation properties of half-`-sequences
using eq. (2.6) with N = 2. For 0 ≤ τ < T , we see that
si + si+τ =
(
2−ih (mod q) (mod 2)
)
+
(
2−τ2−ih (mod q) (mod 2)
)
.
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As before, h is a quadratic residue modulo q and hence the autocorrelation function
of s at shift τ can be written as
Cs(τ) =
∑
x∈Q
(−1)x+(2−τ ·x (mod q)),
where Q is the set of quadratic residues modulo q. We need the following technical
lemmas.
Lemma 4.4.1 [61] Let q > 3 be a prime number. For 1 < u < q − 1, we have
∣∣∣∣∣
q−1∑
x=1
(−1)x+(u·x (mod q))
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2(⌈q6⌉− 1) .
Moreover, for k = 0, 1,
q−1∑
x=1
(−1)x+(u·x (mod q)) = (−1)k · 2
(⌈q
6
⌉
− 1
)
if and only if
u ≡ (−1)k · 3 or (−1)k · 3−1 (mod q).
Let Q
′
denote the set of non-quadratic residues modulo q.
Lemma 4.4.2 Let q be an odd prime and q ≡ 7 (mod 8). We have
∑
x∈Q
(−1)x+(u·x (mod q)) =
∑
x∈Q′
(−1)x+(u·x (mod q)). (4.3)
Proof . When q ≡ 7 (mod 8), by the law of quadratic reciprocity [49] we have 2 ∈ Q
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and −1 ∈ Q′ . Then one can check
∑
x∈Q′
(−1)x+(u·x (mod q)) =
∑
x∈Q
(−1)(−x) (mod q)+(u·(−x) (mod q))
=
∑
x∈Q
(−1)(q−x)+(q−(u·x (mod q)))
=
∑
x∈Q
(−1)−(x+(u·x (mod q)))
=
∑
x∈Q
(−1)x+(u·x (mod q)).

Remarks. Lemma 4.4.2 is not true if q ≡ 1 (mod 8). For example, if q = 41 and
u ≡ 2 (mod q), then the left hand side of eq. (4.3) is 8 while the right hand side of
eq. (4.3) is −8.
Theorem 4.4.1 Let s be a binary half-`-sequence with prime connection integer q >
3 and q ≡ 7 (mod 8). For 0 < τ < (q − 1)/2, the autocorrelation of s satisfies
|Cs(τ)| ≤
⌈q
6
⌉
− 1.
Moreover, if 3 is a quadratic residue modulo q, then
Cs(τ) =
⌈q
6
⌉
− 1
if and only if
2−τ ≡ 3 or 3−1 (mod q).
If 3 is a non-quadratic residue modulo q, then
Cs(τ) = 1−
⌈q
6
⌉
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if and only if
2−τ ≡ −3 or − 3−1 (mod q).
Proof . By Lemma 4.4.2, we get
Cs(τ) =
1
2
q−1∑
x=1
(−1)x+(2−τ ·x (mod q)).
Then applying Lemma 4.4.1, we get the bound of Cs(τ).
Since 2−τ is a quadratic residue modulo q, according to Lemma 4.4.1 again, we
have
Cs(τ) =
⌈q
6
⌉
− 1 if and only if 2−τ ≡ 3 or 3−1 (mod q),
if 3 is a quadratic residue modulo q, and otherwise
Cs(τ) = 1−
⌈q
6
⌉
if and only if 2−τ ≡ −3 or − 3−1 (mod q).

Since the autocorrelation value of a binary half-`-sequence does not satisfy any of
the four criteria for an optimal sequence, it is not optimal.
Remarks. Theorem 4.4.1 does not holds when q 6≡ 7 (mod 8). For example,
when q = 41 ≡ 1 (mod 8), Cs(τ) = 8 > dq/6e − 1 = 6 when 2−τ = 2 (mod q).
4.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we introduce distribution properties of pseudorandom sequences by
combining two half-`-sequences using modular addition. A bound for the number
of occurrences of combined half-`-sequences in one symbol case is given. Bounds on
the higher odrder distribution (e.g., the number of occurrences of two symbols) are
not discussed here due to the increased number of cases and the resulting weaker
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bound. We present bounds on the distribution of pairs (sn, sn+τ ) for `-sequences.
The autocorrelation of half-`-sequences is also discussed.
Copyright c© Ting Gu, 2016.
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Chapter 5 Correlation Immune Functions
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a new correlation attack on nonlinear combination generators is
proposed. The success of this attack depends on the correlation between the output
of a nonlinear function of several LFSRs and the output of the nonlinear combination
function in the generator. To measure resistance to such attacks, we introduce the idea
of q-correlation immune functions. We investigate the properties of these functions
and their constructions.
Figure 5.1 shows a nonlinear combination generator with n LFSRs and a nonlinear
combination function f . Let X t = {xt1, xt2, · · · , xtn} denote the n output bits from
LFSR 1
LFSR 2
···
LFSR n
ffifl
fi
f
ffifl
fi
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z~XXXXXXXz






3
?
- -
xt1
xt2
xtn
st
plaintext ciphertext
Figure 5.1: Stream Cipher with a Nonlinear Combination Generator
the n LFSRs at time t and ri be the length of the ith LFSR for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The
combination function f is a Boolean function of n variables from Fn2 to F2: at time t
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the generator output a single bit
st = f(X
t).
This single bit st will XOR with a plaintext bit to get a ciphertext bit. The
combination function f should be balanced in order to generate keystream bits as
close to the uniform distribution as possible. In other words, f should output 0 or 1
with probability 1/2.
5.1.1 Correlation Attacks
There are many types of correlation attacks on stream ciphers and block ciphers.
The goal of these attacks is to recover the secret key. In a brute force attack of
the scheme in Figure 5.1, we may need O(2r1+r2+···+rn) operations to get the initial
states of the LFSRs. However, this is infeasible if r1 + ... + rn is large enough (128
will do). Siegenthaler designed a correlation attack based on the correlation between
the output of LFSRs and keystream from the combination function in a divide-and-
conquer manner [59]. One can guess and exploit the initial states of the LFSRs one
by one. The complexity of this attack needs O(
∑n
i=1 2
ri) operations, which is much
less than is needed by a brute force attack. The attack applies if and only if the
output keystream is correlated to the output of one LFSR or a linear combination of
the output of LFSRs. For simplicity, we only discuss the situation when the output
keystream is correlated to the output of one LFSR. This equivalently means that
there exists i such that the linear bias
ε =
∣∣∣∣prob(xti = st)− 12
∣∣∣∣ 6= 0,
where xti and st are the outputs at time t from the ith LFSR and keystream generator
respectively. This correlation can be detected by computing the correlation between
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N bits of the keystream and the corresponding output bits of the LFSR generated
from a guessed initial state x0i :
C(st, x
t
i) =
N−1∑
t=0
(−1)st⊕xti .
The expected value of the quantity is 2Nε when x0i is the correct value of the initial
state for the ith LFSR. This attack consists of an exhaustive search of all the ri
bits of the initial state x0i . For each guess value x
0
i , the correlation between the N
keystream bits and output bits of LFSR is calculated. By comparing the C(st, x
t
i)
with a given threshold one can determine whether a guess is right or wrong. The
output keystream bits are expected to be uncorrelated with the output of ith LFSR
for a wrong guess.
To resist such attacks, Siegenthaler introduced the notion of correlation immune
functions, which reflects a relation between f(x) and the linear functions (or affine
functions). We recall that f(x) is correlation immune of order k if its values are
statistically independent of any subset of k input variables, or f(x) is statistically in-
dependent of any linear or affine functions. Xiao and Massey investigated correlation
immunity of order k via the Walsh-Hadamard transform (see Section 2.3) as shown
in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1.1 (Xiao-Massey Theorem)[65] A Boolean function f(x) is correlation
immune of order k if and only if W (f)(ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Fn2 with 1 ≤ wt(ω) ≤ k.
5.1.2 New Correlation Attacks
The correlation attacks introduced by Siegenthaler are based on the correlation be-
tween keystream sequence and a linear combination of the outputs of several LFSRs.
It is natural to ask whether we can find a correlation between keystream sequence
and a nonlinear combination of the outputs of LFSRs, and, if so, will it need fewer
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keystream bits and have lower time complexity? Let q(x) = q(x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈ Bn,
which combines the outputs from k LFSRs. More precisely, q(x) depends on only
k variables xi1 , xi2 , · · · , xik where 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Actually, the bigger k is the more
keystream bits are needed by the attack [17].
We can build a statistical model as Siegenthaler does for the correlation attack
by measuring the correlation between f(x) and q(x). Let Xi be the random variable
over the output of the ith LFSR for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Each Xi satisfy the probability
distribution
prob(Xi) =

prob(xi = 1) = 1/2
prob(xi = 0) = 1/2.
Note here we assume the output sequence of each LFSR is an m-sequence.
Let Y t be the random variable over the output of function f . We have P (Y t =
1) = P (Y t = 0). Let Zt be the random variable over the output of function q(x). We
have
prob(Zt) =

prob(z = 1) = wt(q)
2k
prob(z = 0) = 1− wt(q)
2k
.
We also have
prob[(Y t ⊕ Zt) = 1] = 1
2
− ε.
We use random variable
α =
N−1∑
t=0
(1− 2(Y t ⊕ Zt)) (5.1)
as a measure for the correlation between Y t and Zt. Since all the terms (Y t ⊕ Zt)
in the sum of eq. (5.1) are independent and identically distributed random variables,
β =
∑N−1
t=0 (Y
t ⊕ Zt) satisfies a binomial distribution. It has mean value mβ and
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variance σ2β given by
mβ = N(
1
2
− ε)
and
σ2β = N(
1
2
+ ε)(
1
2
− ε).
The mean value mα and variance σ
2
α will be
mα = N − 2N(1
2
− ε) = 2ε
and
σ2α = 2
2σ2β = 4N(
1
2
+ ε)(
1
2
− ε).
When ε = 0, we have
mα = 0
and
σ2α = N.
The random variable α can be assumed to be normally distributed with mean value
mα and variance σ
2
α for large N due to the central limit theorem.
Our attack works as follows.
step 1: Observe N bits of keystream st where st ∈ F2. These keystream bits
are not required to be consecutive, but if they are not, then we need to record their
positions.
step 2: Guess the initial states of k different LFSRs. There are 2ri1+···+rik possible
initial states. For each of the guessed initial states, we compute the state value
(xti1 , x
t
i2
, · · · , xtik) at corresponding time t. Then we compute q(xti1 , xti2 , · · · , xtik) and
evaluate α.
step 3: Input a constant threshold value c∗ for α. If α > c∗, the guessed initial
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states are regarded as the right ones. Otherwise, run the above steps again with new
guessed initial states.
The detail of the calculation is related to hypothesis testing [51].
5.1.3 q-transform
The Walsh-Hadamard transform measures the relations between f(x) and affine func-
tions. Sometimes we need to consider a relation between f(x) and a function of small
degree but larger than one. A typical application is the algebraic attack on stream
ciphers. Klapper introduced the notion of q-transform [38], which is a generalization
of the Walsh-Hadamard transform, to measure the proximity of two functions.
Let GLn be the set of nonsingular n by n matrices with entries in F2. The
cardinality of GLn is
N = (2n − 20)(2n − 21) · · · (2n − 2n−1).
For a Boolean function q(x) ∈ Bn, the q-transform of f(x) at A ∈ GLn is the real
valued function on GLn
W q(f)(A) =
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)f(x)+q(xA).
In fact, the q-transform measures the Hamming distance between f(x) and the func-
tions from the following set
Sq = {q(xA) : A ∈ GLn},
which is the smallest set of functions obtained from q(x) by change of basis. We
remark that, if q(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = xi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n (in fact q(x) can be any
linear function), W q(f)(A) exactly runs through W (f)(ω), where ω 6= 0, N/(2n − 1)
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many times when A ranges over GLn. Additionally we set
W q(f)(0) =
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)f(x),
where 0 is the zero matrix of n by n.
Define the set for q(x)
Hq = {H ∈ GLn : qH(x) = q(x)},
which is called the stabilizer of q(x). One can show that Hq is a subgroup of GLn
since Hq is closed under multiplication. The cosets
AHq = {AH : H ∈ Hq}, A ∈ GLn
give a partition of GLn. One can check
W q(f)(AH) = W q(f)(A) for H ∈ Hq. (5.2)
So we only need to take a representative of each coset of Hq into account.
We can generalize the new correlation attack in section 5.1.2 by using qA(x) =
q(xA) where A ∈ GLn. All these qA(x) where A ∈ GLn can be used as nonlinear
functions that combine the outputs of LFSRs to launch the new correlation attacks.
We call these attacks q-correlation attacks. To resist q-correlation attacks, the func-
tion f(x) must be statistically independent of qA(x) for A ∈ GLn just as f(x) needs
to be correlation immune to resist correlation attacks. The q-transform is a tool for
understanding resistance to a q-correlation attack. We define q-correlation immune
functions in the next section.
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5.2 Definitions of q-correlation Immune Functions
In order to introduce the notion of the q-correlation immune function, we define the
weight of a matrix as follows.
Definition 5.2.1 Let A = (a1|a2| . . . |an) be an n by n matrix over F2, where ai is
the i-th column of A for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We define the weight of A, denoted by col.wt(A),
as the maximal value among the weights of the columns of A, i.e.,
col.wt(A) = max{wt(ai) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Furthermore we define the weight of a matrix A with respect to q(x) or more precisely
with respect to Hq.
Definition 5.2.2 Let A ∈ GLn. We define the weight of A with respect to q(x),
denoted by wtq(A), as the minimal value among the weights of AH for all H ∈ Hq,
i.e.,
wtq(A) = min {col.wt(AH) : H ∈ Hq} .
Then we can choose a representative matrix A of the coset AHq with the weight
wtq(A).
Let
S1 = {A ∈ GLn : q(xA) depends on at most k vairiables}
and
S2 = {A ∈ GLn : 1 ≤ wtq(A) ≤ k}.
Lemma 5.2.1 Suppose q(x) =
∏
i∈I xi where I ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , n}. In other words, q(x)
is a monomial. Suppose that qA(x) = q(xA) depends on only k variables. Then all
xj appearing in xAi also appear in qA(x), so wt(Ai) ≤ k for i ∈ I.
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Proof . Suppose that for some i ∈ I we have wt(Ai) > k. Let wt(As) = t > k
where s ∈ I we have xAs = xs1 + xs2 + · · · + xst . Then q(xA) =
∏
i∈I(xAi) =
(xs1 + xs2 + · · ·+ xst)
∏
i∈I/{s}(xAi). We claim that xs1 , xs2 , · · · , xst appear in q(xA).
Otherwise, suppose xs1 vanishes in q(xA) and let
∏
i∈I/{s}(xAi) = xs1C +D where C
and D do not contain xs1 . Then we have
xs1(xs1C +D) + xs1xs2C + · · ·+ xs1xstC
= xs1(C +D + xs2C + · · ·+ xstC) = 0,
which means C +D + xs2C + · · ·+ xstC = 0 in F2. Then we have
q(xA) = (xs1 + xs2 + · · ·+ xst)(xs1C +D)
= (xs2 + · · ·+ xst)D
= (xs2 + · · ·+ xst)(1 + xs2 + · · ·+ xst)C
= 0.
Since q(x) and q(xA) have identical distributions of values (up to a permutation),
q(xA) = 0, so is the same for q(x) which is a contradiction to q(x) as a monomial.
Thus all xs1 , xs2 , · · · , xst appear in q(xA), which is a contradiction to that q(xA)
depends on k variables. So wt(Ai) ≤ k.

Lemma 5.2.1 may not hold when q(x) is not a monomial. For example, when
q(x) = (x1 + x3)(x2 + x4), there is an n by n matrix A with q(xA) = x1x2. There
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exists an i with 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 such that wt(Ai) = 3 > 2, e.g.,
A =

1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1

.
Lemma 5.2.2 If q(x) is a monomial and qA(x) = q(xA) depends on only k variables,
then there is B ∈ Hq such that 1 ≤ col.wt(AB) ≤ k.
Proof . It is trivial that col.wt(AB) ≥ 1. Suppose q(x) = ∏i∈I xi where I ⊂
{1, 2, · · · , n}. Then q(xA) = ∏i∈I(xAi). Since q(xA) depends on only k variables,
from Lemma 5.2.1 we have wt(Ai) ≤ k. Let C be an invertible matrix with Ci = Ai
where i ∈ I and each of whose remaining n−|I| columns has weight 1. Also, we have
q(xC) =
∏
i∈I
(xAi) = q(xA).
As a result, we have C = AB where B ∈ Hq and col.wt(AB) = col.wt(C) ≤ k.

We then have the following two types of definitions of q-correlation immune of
order k according to S1 and S2.
Definition 5.2.3 A Boolean function f(x) ∈ Bn is type I q-correlation immune of
order k if W q(f)(A) = 0 for all A ∈ S1.
Definition 5.2.4 A Boolean function f(x) ∈ Bn is type II q-correlation immune of
order k if W q(f)(A) = 0 for all A ∈ S2.
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Theorem 5.2.1 Let f be a Boolean function in Bn. If q(x) is a monomial and f is
type II q-correlation immune of order k, then f is also a type I q-correlation immune
of order k.
Proof . If q(x) is a monomial and qA(x) = q(xA) depends on only k variables, from
Lemma 5.2.2, we know that there is B ∈ Hq such that 1 ≤ col.wt(AB) ≤ k. Thus,
1 ≤ wtq(A) ≤ k. Hence we have S1 ⊂ S2. As a result, if f is type II q-correlation
immune of order k, then f is also a type I q-correlation immune of order k.

When q(x) = x1, according to the analysis above, f(x) is both type I and type II
q-correlation immune of order k if and only if it is correlation immune of order k. So
we can view both definitions as generalizations of correlation immunity.
From Definition 5.2.4, we find that the notion depends heavily on Hq, which is
not easy to determine. Below we prove an equivalent definition, which however only
depends on the weight col.wt(A) of A.
Theorem 5.2.2 (Equivalent definition). A Boolean function f(x) ∈ Bn is type
II q-correlation immune of order k iff W q(f)(A) = 0 for all A ∈ GLn with 1 ≤
col.wt(A) ≤ k.
Proof . For A ∈ GLn, we have wtq(A) ≤ col.wt(A), so 1 ≤ col.wt(A) ≤ k implies
1 ≤ wtq(A) ≤ k. Thus if W q(f)(A) = 0 for all A ∈ GLn with 1 ≤ col.wt(A) ≤ k,
then f(x) is type II q-correlation immune of order k.
Conversely, for A ∈ GLn with 1 ≤ wtq(A) ≤ k, there is an H ∈ Hq such that
col.wt(AH) = wtq(A) ≤ k. So by (5.2), we get W q(f)(A) = 0, i.e., f(x) is type II
q-correlation immune of order k.

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5.3 Equivalent Characterizations for q-correlation Immune Functions
Theorem 5.3.1 For any Boolean function q(x) ∈ Bn, a function f(x) ∈ Bn is type
II q-correlation immune of order k if and only if f(x) + qA(x) is balanced for all
A ∈ GLn with 1 ≤ col.wt(A) ≤ k.
The proof of Theorem 5.3.1 follows from the definition of q-transform directly. From
Theorem 5.3.1 we can know that if f(x) is q-correlation immune of order k, then it is
resistant to q-correlation attacks involving any k LFSR outputs, since the probability
prob(f(x) = qA(x)) = 1/2 for all A ∈ GLn with 1 ≤ col.wt(A) ≤ k.
We would also like to discuss other equivalent statements for q-correlation immune
functions.
Definition 5.3.1 The functions f(x) and qA(x) are statistically independent if
prob(f(x) = 1|qA(x) = 1) = prob(f(x) = 1|qA(x) = 0) = prob(f(x) = 1). (5.3)
Here we give an example first. Let q(x) = q(x1, x2, x3) = x1x2x3 + x1 + x2 + x3.
We find that for those A with col.wt(A) = 1, we have
qA(x) = q(xA) = q(x).
We choose f(x) = 1 if x ∈ {(000), (100), (101)} and f(x) = 0 otherwise, we can prove
f(x) + qA(x) is balanced, i.e., f(x) is a q-correlation immune function of order 1 by
Theorem 5.3.1. However, f(x) and qA(x) are not statistically independent because
eq. (5.3) does not hold. We note that in this example, q(x) is not balanced. But for
balanced functions q(x) we have following results.
Theorem 5.3.2 Let q(x) ∈ Bn be a balanced function. Then f(x) ∈ Bn is type
II q-correlation immune of order k if and only if f(x) and qA(x) are statistically
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independent for all A ∈ GLn with 1 ≤ col.wt(A) ≤ k.
To prove Theorem 5.3.2, we need the following lemma. For a Boolean function
g(x), the weight of g(x) denoted by wt(g) is wt(g) = |{x ∈ Fn2 : g(x) = 1}|.
Lemma 5.3.1 For a function q(x) ∈ Bn, we have wt(q) = wt(qA) for all A ∈ GLn.
In particular if q(x) is balanced, then so is qA(x) for all A ∈ GLn.
Proof . The result follows from the fact that xA ranges over Fn2 as x does. 
Proof of Theorem 5.3.2: First we suppose that f(x) is q-correlation immune of
order k. By Theorem 5.3.1 we see that f(x) + qA(x) is balanced for all A ∈ GLn with
1 ≤ col.wt(A) ≤ k. For such A we let
Mij = |{x ∈ Fn2 : f(x) = i, qA(x) = j}|, where i, j ∈ F2.
Then we have M10 +M01 = 2
n−1 since f(x)+qA(x) is balanced and M11 +M01 = 2n−1
since qA(x) is balanced by Lemma 5.3.1. So we get M11 = M10 and
prob(f(x) = 1|qA(x) = 1) = M11
2n−1
=
2M11
2n
=
M11 +M10
2n
=
wt(f)
2n
= prob(f(x) = 1).
Similarly we have
prob(f(x) = 1|qA(x) = 0) = wt(f)
2n
= prob(f(x) = 1),
and we complete the proof of the first part.
Now we suppose that f(x) and qA(x) are statistically independent for all A ∈ GLn
with 1 ≤ col.wt(A) ≤ k. For such A, we see that prob(qA(x) = 0) = prob(qA(x) =
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1) = 1/2 since qA(x) is balanced. Then for b ∈ F2 we get
prob(f(x) + qA(x) = b)
=
∑
i∈F2
prob(f(x) = i, qA(x) = b− i)
=
∑
i∈F2
prob(f(x) = i|qA(x) = b− i) · prob(qA(x) = b− i)
=
∑
i∈F2
prob(f(x) = i) · prob(qA(x) = b− i)
= 1
2
∑
i∈F2
prob(f(x) = i) = 1
2
,
which indicates that f(x) + qA(x) is balanced. Hence we complete the proof by
Theorem 5.3.1.

By a similar proof, we can get the following result.
Theorem 5.3.3 Let q(x) ∈ Bn be a balanced function. Then f(x) ∈ Bn is type
II q-correlation immune of order k if and only if prob(qA(x) = 1|f(x) = 1) =
prob(qA(x) = 0|f(x) = 1) = 1/2 for all A ∈ GLn with 1 ≤ col.wt(A) ≤ k.
5.4 Certain Properties of q-correlation Immune Functions
Proposition 5.4.1 If f(x) ∈ Bn is type II q-correlation immune of order k ≥ 1,
then deg(f) = n iff wt(q) is odd.
Proof . We see that wt(qA) = wt(q) for all A ∈ GLn by Lemma 5.3.1 and f(x)+qA(x)
is balanced for all A ∈ GLn with 1 ≤ col.wt(A) ≤ k by Theorem 5.3.1. So wt(q) is
odd if and only if wt(f) is odd and hence deg(f) = n.

Proposition 5.4.2 Let C ∈ GLn with col.wt(C) = 1. If f(x) ∈ Bn is type II
q-correlation immune of order k, then so is f(xC).
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Proof . Write fC(x) = f(xC). We have for A ∈ GLn
W q(fC)(A) = W q(f)(C
−1A).
On the other hand, the restriction on col.wt(C) = 1 implies that the weight of each
column of C is one, so is the weight of each column C−1, i.e., col.wt(C−1) = 1. Hence
we get
col.wt(C−1A) = col.wt(A), A ∈ GLn.
Now for all A ∈ GLn with 1 ≤ col.wt(A) ≤ k, we derive W q(f)(C−1A) = 0 since f(x)
is q-correlation immune of order k. Then we can get the desired result according to
the analysis above. 
5.5 Construction of q-correlation Immune Functions
In this section, we discuss the possible techniques for the construction of q-correlation
immune functions.
5.5.1 A General Construction
Here we give a general construction of type II q-correlation immune functions of order
k. Let 1 ≤ r < n. Suppose that q(x) ∈ Bn depends only on x1, . . . , xr. For A ∈ GLn
with col.wt(A) ≤ k, we see that qA(x) depends on at most kr coordinates.
Let f(x) = f1(x)+f2(x) ∈ Bn, where f1(x) ∈ Bn is a linear function that depends
on at least kr + 1 coordinates and f2(x) ∈ Bn (possibly nonlinear) depends only on
the complement of the support of f1(x). Here the support of f1(x) means the set of
variables appearing in the algebraic normal form of f1(x).
It follows that f(x) + qA(x) has the form g(x) + xi for some g ∈ Bn and 1 ≤
i ≤ n such that g(x) does not depend on xi. Therefore f(x) + qA(x) is balanced, so
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W q(f)(A) = 0 for all A ∈ GLn with col.wt(A) ≤ k. This means f is q-correlation
immune of order k by Theorem 5.2.2.
We find that from the construction above
deg(f) ≤ n− (kr + 1).
However, there do exist f(x) and q(x) such that f(x) is q-correlation immune of
order n and deg(f) = n. For example, let q(0) = 0 and wt(q) = 2n−1 − 1. We have
qA(0) = 0 and wt(qA) = 2
n−1 − 1 for all A ∈ GLn. Then both f(x) and 1 + f(x)
satisfying
f(x) =
 1, if x = 0,0, otherwise,
are q-correlation immune of order n.
5.5.2 Construction Based on Linear Codes
Let F be a finite field of size p. An [n, k, d] linear code C is a linear subspace of Fn of
dimension k and with minimum distance d, i.e., the minimum Hamming weight of its
nonzero code words is d. For every two codewords c1, c2 ∈ C, we have a1c1 + a2c2 ∈ C
where a1, a2 ∈ F. Every basis of a linear [n, k, d] code consists of k codewords.
Therefore the size of C is pk. A generator matrix of an [n, k, d] linear code over F is
a k × n matrix, typically denote by G. The rows of G form a basis of the code and
G is not unique for a given linear code. The rank of a generator matrix C equals the
dimension of C.
Wu and Dawson [64] investigated correlation immunity based on linear codes as
shown in Lemma 5.5.1. We next generalize their construction to type I q-correlation
immunity.
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Lemma 5.5.1 [64] If G is a generating matrix of an [n, k, d] linear code, then for
any g(y) ∈ Bk, the correlation immunity of f(x) = g(xGT ) is at least d− 1.
Lemma 5.5.2 Let q(x) =
∏m
j=1 xij . Let A = (A1|A2| · · · |An) be an n by n matrix.
If q(xA) depends on at most k variables, then
|supp(xAi1) ∪ supp(xAi2) ∪ · · · ∪ supp(xAim)| ≤ k.
Proof . Let wt(As) = t where s ∈ {i1, i2, · · · , im} and xAs = xs1 +xs2 + · · ·+xst . By
Lemma 5.2.1 we know that xs1 , xs2 , · · · , xst all appear in q(xA). As a result, if q(xA)
depends on at most k variables, then
|supp(xAi1) ∪ supp(xAi2) ∪ · · · ∪ supp(xAim)| ≤ k.

Theorem 5.5.1 Let q(x) be a monomial depending on m variables. In other words,
q(x) = xi1xi2 · · · xim ∈ Bn where 0 ≤ m ≤ n. Let C be an [n, k, d ≥ 2] code with
generator matrix G. Let g ∈ Bk be nondegenerate and let f(x) = g(xGtr) ∈ Bn.
Then f is type I q-correlation immune of order d− 1.
Proof . Let A = (A1|A2| · · · |An), we have
q(xA) = (xAi1)(xAi2) · · · (xAim).
Let
ω(Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Aim) = |supp(xAi1) ∪ supp(xAi2) ∪ · · · ∪ supp(xAim)|.
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From Lemma 5.5.2 we know that f is type I q-correlation immune of order t if for all
the linearly independent Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Aim such that
ω(Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Aim) ≤ t,
we have
rank(Gtr|Atri1 |Atri2 | · · · |Atrim) = k +m. (5.4)
Let H = {∑mj=1 ajAij |aj ∈ F2}. Eq. (5.4) is equivalent to saying that H ∩C = {0n}.
Let e be the minimum value of ω(Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Aim) over all Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Aim that
are linearly independent and satisfy H ∩ C 6= {0n}.
We know that
ω(Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Aim) ≥ max{wt(h), h ∈ H}.
If H ∩ C 6= {0n}, there exists a nonzero h′ ∈ H ∩ C. Since wt(h′) ≥ d, then
ω(Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Aim) ≥ d.
Thus e ≥ d. Then f is q-correlation immune of order d− 1. 
When q(x) is linear, f(x) is both type I and type II q-correlation immune of
order k if and only if it is correlation immune of order k. At the end of this section,
we discuss some relations between correlation immune functions and q-correlation
immune functions based on linear codes when q(x) is nonlinear.
Lemma 5.5.3 Let G be the generating matrix of an [n, 2, d] linear code where d ≥
4 and let the transpose of generating matrix GT = [g1, g2]. Let g(y) = y1y2 and
f(x) = g(xGT ) = (xg1)(xg2) = (
⊕m
i=1 xsi)(
⊕n
j=1 xtj). If q(x) = xcxd where c, d ∈
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{1, 2, · · · , n} \ {s1, s2, · · · , sm, t1, t2, · · · , tn}. Then the correlation immunity of f(x)
is at least 3 and f(x) + q(x) is unbalanced.
Proof . The correlation immunity of f(x) = g(xGT ) is at least d−1 ≥ 3 from Lemma
5.5.1. We also have that xgT1 , xg
T
2 , xc, xd are linearly independent. As a result, the
rank of f(x) + q(x) = (xgT1 )(xg
T
2 ) + xcxd is 4. According to the classification of
quadratic forms in [30], f(x) + q(x) is unbalanced.

From Lemma 5.5.3, we can get a class of Boolean function f(x) which is correlation
immune of order higher than 3 but is not type I q-correlation immune of order 2.
Let’s consider the case when f(x) is q-correlation immune of order k but is not
correlation immune of order k. Experimental results show the existence of such f(x).
For example, f(x) = x1x2 +x1x3 +x1x4 +x2x3 +x2x4 +x3x4 is q-correlation immune
of order 2 but is not correlation immune of order 2 over 4 variables.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we present a new correlation attack by exploring the correlation
between the output of a nonlinear function of several LFSRs and the output of the
nonlinear combination function in the generator. To resist this attack, we propose
the idea of q-correlation immune functions. We give two definitions of q-correlation
immune functions. Certain properties and possible constructions are discussed.
Copyright c© Ting Gu, 2016.
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Chapter 6 Future Work
This dissertation presents research work on distribution properties of N -ary half-`-
sequences with odd prime connection integers. One can generalize the definition of
half-`-sequences with prime power connection integers. In the future, I plan to explore
more on some statistical properties of generalized half-`-sequences. This dissertation
discusses a new type of correlation attack and q-correlation immune functions. In
this chapter, we outline the research directions in these areas and the topics that we
are interested to work on in the future.
6.1 Half-`-sequences with Prime Power Connection Integers
As mentioned above, we would like to investigate some statistical properties of gen-
eralized half-`-sequences with prime power connection integers. Let q = pm with p an
odd prime and m ≥ 1. We extend the definition of half-`-sequences in the following
way.
Definition 6.1.1 A sequence s with prime power connection integer q is called a
half-`-sequence if the period of s is φ(q)/2.
Indeed, when m = 1, s is the half-`-sequence we discussed in Chapter 3.
Let ξ be a complex primitive qth root of unity. In Chapter 3, we need a bound on
∑
z∈Q
ξbz
where b 6≡ 0 (mod q) when q is an odd prime. Now we extend the result to the case
when q is a prime power by using the following lemma.
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Lemma 6.1.1 [19] Let f be a polynomial over Z of degree d ≥ 1 and dp ≡ d (mod p).
Then for any prime p with dp ≥ 1 and any m ≥ 1 we have
∣∣∣∣∣
pm∑
x=1
ξf(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3(d− 1)pm(1−1/d).
In particular,
∣∣∣∣∣∑
z∈Q
ξbz
∣∣∣∣∣ = 12
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c∈Z∗pm
ξbc
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 12
∣∣∣∣∣∣
pm∑
c=1
ξbc
2 −
pm−1∑
d=1
ξc(pd)
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣
pm∑
c=1
ξbc
2
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
pm−1∑
d=1
(ξp
2
)cd
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣

=
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣
pm∑
c=1
ξbc
2
∣∣∣∣∣+ p
∣∣∣∣∣∣
pm−2∑
d=1
(ξp
2
)cd
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣

≤ 1
2
(
3pm/2 + p · 3p(m−2)/2) = 3pm/2.
where b 6≡ 0 (mod pm) and Q is the set of quadratic residues modulo pm.
The Fourier transform of a complex valued function f : Zpm → C is given by
fˆ(b) =
1
pm
pm−1∑
c=0
f(c)ξ−bc.
By the Fourier inversion formula we have
f(c) =
pm−1∑
b=0
fˆ(b)ξbc.
In the future, we plan to investigate the following problems related to some sta-
tistical properties of half-`-sequences with prime power connection integers.
• The number of occurrences of one symbol within one period of a half-`-sequence;
• The number of pairs of symbols with a fixed distance between them within one
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period of a half-`-sequence;
• The number of triples of consecutive symbols within one period of a half-`-
sequence;
• The autocorrelation of a half-`-sequence.
6.2 Problems Related to q-transform
In this dissertation, we present a new correlation attack by exploiting the correlation
between the output of a nonlinear function of several LFSRs and the output of the
nonlinear combination function in the generator. We build a statistical model for this
attack and describe the steps of this attack. Much work is needed for the analysis of
this attack. In the future, we plan to work in the following directions.
• The data complexity or the number of keystream bits needed for the the attack;
• The success rate of this attack;
• The linear bias plays an important role in the analysis of data complexity and
success rate. We are interested in finding efficient methods to obtain a nonlinear
function such that the linear bias reaches maximum value;
• Analysis of the new correlation attack on existing LFSR based stream ciphers.
To resist the new correlation attack, we propose the idea of q-correlation immune
functions based on q-transform. Certain properties are discussed for q-correlation
immune functions. We also discuss the construction of q-correlation immune functions
when q(x) is a monomial. We plan to pursue more results on the construction of q-
correlation immune functions when q(x) is a polynomial in the future. We are also
interested in counting the number of such functions.
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6.3 Design of Stream Ciphers based on FCSRs
While there are several stream ciphers based on LFSRs, F-FCSR stream ciphers
in eSTREAM project [55] are the first popular FCSR based stream ciphers that
arouse much attention. The F-FCSR stream cipher uses an FCSR in Galois mode
and takes a linear combination of the state bits to produce output. This stream
cipher is extremely fast due to the very simple output function. It was initially in
the eSTREAM portfolio, but was subsequently broken by Hell and Johansson [35]
due to the linearity of its filter function. Nonetheless, in his plenary talk at SETA
2012, Johansson said he believes FCSRs have an important role as building blocks for
future stream ciphers. I plan to replace the linear output function with a nonlinear
output function, which generate equivalent sequence for F-FCSR and work on a more
complex FCSR based construction to design secure stream ciphers.
Copyright c© Ting Gu, 2016.
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